Study on Rare Earth Management Game Between Central and Local Governments in China
The interest claim for management of rare earth among central and local governments is not identical. Even in some specific problems they are at variance. So there is a benefit game process. Through establishing a non-cooperative dynamic game theory model, the paper analyzes the strategy selection and game results of Chinese rare earth management among central and local governments, concludes root reasons fort existing problems. And then it offers some specific countermeasures and suggestions.
Key words: Rare earth management; Central government; Local government; Game
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