The Study on Supervision Model for Online Advertising Click Fraud
Considering the click fraud in the online advertising market, a basic game theoretic model for click fraud is built firstly. In this model, the Ads Network can choose to make click fraud supervision or trust, and advertising publishers can choose to publish advertisement honestly or to cheat. In this paper, we get the result of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution firstly and then we extend the model to the 2-supervision game model, and then discuss the effect factors when the Ads network is punished due to click fraud. Further more, the model considers the influence on click fraud caused by the competitions between the multi-publishers and then get the new result of the Nash equilibrium solution. Based on the analysis above, click fraud can be effectively prevented in the following ways: intensifying the supervision and control process, implementing penalty on advertising network, reducing information asymmetry, choosing the honest publisher to publish advertisement, building the competitive mechanism, evaluating the online advertising effectiveness in time, and signing detailed operational contract in advance.
Key words: Online advertising; Click fraud; Supervision model; Nash equilibrium
Online advertising; Click fraud; Supervision model; Nash equilibrium
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