The Optimal Decisions of the “Company + Farmer” Contract-Farming Supply Chain With Nash Bargain Fair Reference

Jipu WANG

Abstract


The contract-farming supply chain model consisting of one risk-neutral agribusiness and one risk-averse farmer with fairness concerns is proposed under stochastic yield. The fair reference framework is established according to Nash bargaining game. The impact on the optimal decision of contract-farming supply chain by the risk-averse farmer’s fairness concerns. The numerical study illustrates the application of the model, and analyze some parameter influencing the optimal decision between one risk-neutral agribusiness and one risk-averse farmer with fairness concerns.

Keywords


Nash bargaining game; Fairness concerns; Contract-farming supply chain; CVaR

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/n

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