Coordination of Decentralized Supply Chains: A Literature Review

Nan ZHANG

Abstract


Due to the fact that the double margin exists in the decentralized supply chain, many papers focus on the coordination of decentralized supply chain. In this paper, we classify these papers into three parts according to the structure of supply chain. The first kind of supply chain consists of one upstream supplier and one downstream retailer. The second one consists of multiple suppliers and a single retailer. The last one refers to the supply chain with multiple suppliers and a single retailer. This paper can enable readers to get the knowledge of existing research on supply chain coordination. We also give some interesting future research concerning this topic.


Keywords


Supply chain; Demand uncertainty; Double margin; Coordination

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968%2Fj.mse.1913035X20130703.2686

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