ASYMMETRY INFORMATION PROBLEM OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN A NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: THE CASE OF GHANA NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE

OBENG NYANTAKYI CLEMENT

Abstract


Due to special properties of moral hazard and adverse selection in health insurance contract, governments’ effort to efficiently provide health care services to their citizens tends to encounter many problems, especially in low income countries. The National Health Insurance of Ghana has not been immune to this problem. This paper, explores empirical research to test for the asymmetric information problem of moral hazard and adverse selection in health insurance contracts. It uses both quantitative and qualitative to analyze data gathered through a meaningfully administered questionnaire in the Sekyere West District of Ghana to make its conclusion on the subject matter.
Keywords: National Health Insurance; Moral Hazard; Healthcare; Adverse Selection; Asymmetry Information

Keywords


National Health Insurance; Moral Hazard; Healthcare; Adverse Selection; Asymmetry Information

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968%2Fj.mse.1913035X20090303.010

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