The Chinese Higher Educational Model: 1950s to 1980s

INTRODUCTION

Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s ascent to power in 1949, Chinese higher education policy has followed a fluctuating path determined by the twists and turns in the politics of the post-1949 Chinese state and that was particularly the case in the pre-reform era (1950s-1970s). This article, through investigating the changes of leadership that have occurred in Chinese universities and the duties of university administrators, examines the zigzag course which Chinese higher education policy has followed, identifying the model that shaped China’s higher education during the period from the 1950s to the 1980s. It also looks at what changes have taken place in China’s higher education since the 1980s, putting the pre-reform model in a broader context of China’s educational development. The article argues that the post-reform model for China’s higher education has functioned primarily in setting the political limits for the professional and commercial development of higher education in the course of China’s market-oriented reforms. In comparison with this political boundary-based model, the Chinese higher educational model during the period from the 1950s to 1980s could be identified as a management-oriented model. Not only did it set political limits but it also played an active role in informing the important managerial practices involved in the operation of Chinese universities.

Key words: Model; Management; Leadership; Chinese higher education

“Ideology” is a very popular word in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and plays a fundamental role in all facets of the society. While claiming to be proletarian and “fundamentally different from the ideologies of all the exploiting classes ...” (The Editorial Board for Philosophy of the General Editorial Board of the Chinese Encyclopaedia, 1987, p.1098), the dominant ideology in post-1949 China arguably consists of two sets of beliefs.

One can be called the “pure” ideology which is inherent in the dogma of the CCP. This set of beliefs gives individuals a unified, theoretical and, most importantly, an authoritative sense of the political order and priorities which obtain within PRC society. Pure ideology can be summarized as emphasizing the socialist road, the absolute leadership of the CCP, and loyalty of the Chinese people to the Party itself. Another set of beliefs is rooted in the “practical” ideology of modern China. This corresponds basically to what is taken to be the people’s original, common and natural beliefs in the development of the economy, economic growth, the improvement of living standards and national strength and prosperity.

A combination of both forms of ideology may be expressed in the well-known slogan to uphold both “redness” and “expertise” which was first formulated by Mao Zedong in 1957 (Mao, 1977b, p.471). According to the CCP, “redness” denotes a firm political orientation and adherence to the Four Basic Principles which are adherence to the socialist road, the proletarian dictatorship, the leadership of the CCP, and Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (Deng, 1994a, pp.164-165); “expertise”, on the other hand, consists of practical expertise on the job and the study and mastery of technical or professional knowledge for the construction and modernisation of the nation (The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 1987a, p.182).

As pure ideology, or “redness”, stems from the official ruling body’s belief in its historical mission and demands a political commitment which makes any unofficial political and ideological analysis impossible, and it consequently equates the will of the ruling party with that of the people, we can probably rename it as the single official ideology. Since the founding of the PRC, this single official ideology has always been in the dominant position in the development of China’s higher education. This can be best seen by examining the rigid framework which confines policy fluctuations within higher education in China.

1. THE FRAMEWORK

The framework which characterises the CCP’s educational policy was in fact sketched out before the CCP came to power. The “General Policy on Soviet Cultural Education”, advanced by Mao Zedong in January 1934 in the Jiangxi Central Soviet Area, is an example of this framework. This basic policy stressed the use the communist spirit to educate the laboring masses as well as ensuring that cultural education should serve the revolutionary war and class struggle and that education was combined with labour (The Editorial Board for Education of the Chinese Encyclopaedia’s General Editorial Board, 1985, p.529). The key points in this policy were the use the CCP’s ideology to educate people and the imperative for education to serve politics and political ideology.

In post-1949 China, this framework was given legal force and became the distinguishing feature of the CCP’s national educational policy. The following quotation from CCP policy reveals the basic features of this framework:

>The education policy of the Party is that education serves proletarian politics and education combines with production and labour. In order to implement this policy, education must be led by the Party ... . In a communist society, the new men who develop in an all-round way are those who have both political consciousness and culture, and are able to undertake both mental and manual labour, ... (The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party & The State Council, 1958).

In the light of this quote, the educational framework can be summarised as follows: education in China must be led by the CCP and must serve both the socialist revolution and socialist reconstruction and the product of education must be both “red” and expert.

During the period of the 1950s through to the 1980s, the development of Chinese education was restricted within this framework. If some aspects of this framework appear less ideological in nature than those enunciated in 1934, this is probably because the earlier policy was established by the CCP when it did not have national power and when its basic tasks did not include national economic reconstruction. Having said this, however, it is clear that key elements of the framework have been maintained consistently from before the CCP came to power in 1949 through to the 1980s and even up to today.

2. TWO SUB-MODELS THEORY

As stated earlier, tensions between two political lines in the CCP and their relative strength or weakness at different times during the early decades of the PRC resulted in shifts between two higher education programs during that period. Theodore Hsi-en Chen has demonstrated the key features of these two programs in what he termed “The Academic Model” and “The Revolutionary Model” (hereafter referred as sub-models. Re-terming Chen’s two models is for distinguishing them from the model, as this article identifies, that shaped China’s higher education during the period from the 1950s to the 1980s). “In regard to the Red-expert dichotomy”, wrote Chen, “the academic model focuses on the production of experts with acceptable “Redness” while the revolutionary model gives priority to political-ideological Redness but does not shut out the development of expertise” (Chen, 1981, p.7).
In this description, no antagonistic contradiction seems to exist between these two sub-models. I say so because in post-1949 China, an antagonistic contradiction is considered to be one which is created from the conflict between the interests of the classes “which favour, support and participate in the socialist construction” and those which “are hostile to and sabotage the socialist construction” (Mao, 1977a, p.364).

Looking at the supporters of these two sub-models, it can be seen that both adhere to the value of “redness”. Therefore they represent no contradiction in ideological objectives and class interests. The difference between the two sub-models is only that one stresses the development of expertise more than the other. The following Table 1 from Theodore Hsi-en Chen’s book headed further illustrates this point:

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<td>The zealous revolutionary; the unswerving ideologue and activist. Redness more crucial than expertise. Indigenous experts, barefoot professionals.</td>
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The sub-model that was dominant from 1966 to 1976 (the period of the Cultural Revolution) is undoubtedly the most extreme example of the Revolutionary Model. The sub-model that has come into force since 1976 may be regarded as the most extreme example of the Academic Model.

The reason for this is that an historic change in policies which was described as “a great turn with the profoundest significance in the CCP’s history since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China” (Ma & Chen, 1991, p.428) took place in the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP in 1978. This great turn can perhaps be generalised as a turn from an extreme revolutionary period to a period with great emphasis on construction.

That the period 1966-1976 was an extreme revolutionary period is unlikely to be questioned. What needs to be discussed is why the period since 1978 can be called a period with great emphasis on construction. Two decisions that have historic significance were made by the CCP in its 3rd Plenary Session in 1978. These decisions were: (a) to cease using the slogan “take class struggle as the key link” (yi jieji douzheng weigang), and (b) to shift the work stress of the whole Party to the construction of socialist modernisation (The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 1987b, p.327). Class struggle, which had been such a core element of CCP ideology and integral to the maintenance of the political leadership of the Party, was now to be de-emphasised—this was truly a profound shift and, in my opinion, demonstrates the unprecedented importance given to construction during this period.

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Characteristics of Contrasting Models

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towards construction. Therefore, ultimately, the period 1956-66 cannot be called a period with great emphasis on construction, compared with the period from 1978 onwards when the CCP stopped the use of the slogan “take class struggle as the key link”. The period after 1978 is the only time the CCP attempted to both shift the work stress to construction and relax the emphasis on class struggle. These two important decisions not only “show that the CCP has essentially smashed the long-term heavy bonds of the “Left” deviation” (Ma & Chen, 1991, p.428) but are also evidence that the period from 1978 is the most extreme example of an emphasis on construction since the founding of the People’s Republic.

We can conclude that, as any fundamental change in the CCP’s policies would affect education, the historic change in the CCP’s policies which occurred in 1978 and the change in the leadership system would inevitably cause a corresponding change in educational priorities. Logically this would entail a turn from the most extreme example of the Revolutionary Model to the most extreme example of the Academic Model.

Let us now look at these two extreme examples. They should not be understood as two mutually exclusive sub-models. The Academic Model still includes politics and ideology—the single official ideology—and the Revolutionary Model does not completely ignore production and development. Based on this and also on the basis of the coexistence of both pure and practical forms of ideology in China, it can be argued that the major issue that these two sub-models have struggled with is, in fact, the relation between “redness” and expertise, i.e., whether “redness” or expertise should be emphasised in a practical situation.

Both sub-models insist on “redness” and “expertise”, simply because maintaining both “redness” and “expertise”, as the framework requires, limits any possible major shift in higher education. The 1992 Constitution of the CCP clearly illustrates this. In a period when the extreme example of the Academic Model is in a dominant position, the Constitution emphasises that “it is imperative to take economic construction as the centre of the work, ...” but that “in the whole process of the socialist construction of modernisations, we must adhere to the Four Basic Principles and oppose bourgeois liberalisation” (The Chinese Communist Party, 1992, p.1). This is because the Four Basic Principles (as a reflection of “redness”) “will provide a political guarantee and guiding direction for the socialist construction of modernisation” (Qiao & Zhai, 1991, p.402).

3. LEADERSHIP IN CHINESE UNIVERSITIES

Leadership in universities is an important aspect of the different sub-models of higher education described above and changes in the leadership system are also a direct result of the zigzag course which Chinese higher education policy has followed. The following, which is based on Chinese books published in the 1980s (Wang & Ying, 1983a, pp.226-230; Liu & Li, 1986, pp.1-9), is a brief introduction to the changes of leadership that have occurred in Chinese universities since 1949.

I. The president responsibility system (1950-1956) (Xiaozhang fuze zhi). In this system, the presidents of universities exercised leadership in all academic and administrative management and were responsible directly to the Party and the State. At that time the Party organisation in a university played a key role only in political affairs; this included, for example, supervising ideological remolding and other political movements.

II. The university council responsibility system under the leadership of the Party Committee (1956-1960) (Dangwei lingdao xia de weiyuanhui fuze zhi). In this system, the university council was an organ of power directed by the president, but controlled by the Party Committee. All the important issues were discussed in the Council, but the power of decision-making was held by the Party Committee. The president was only responsible for implementation of decisions made by the Party Committee.

III. The university council responsibility system (with the president as the dominant factor) under the leadership of the Party Committee (1961-1966) (Dangwei lingdao xia de yi xiaozhang weishou de weiyuanhui fuze zhi). In this system, even though the supreme power was still held by the Party Committee, the University Council, particularly the president, could play a more important role in management than in the past.

IV. The centralised Party leadership system (1966-1978). This system was created in a very unusual period, the Cultural Revolution. In this system, the Revolutionary Committee was the organ of power under the leadership of the Party Committee. The Party Committee was involved in all aspects of university life.

V. The president (the president and the vice-presidents) sharing the responsibilities system and (since the 1980s) the president responsibility system under the leadership of the Party Committee (Dangwei lingdao xia de xiaozhang fengong fuze zhi and Dangwei lingdao xia de xiaozhang fuze zhi) (legislated in Higher Education Law which took effect in 1999). In this system, the president took charge of the university’s routine work with vice-presidents helping the president...
to supervise teaching, research and administration. However, all the important issues in the teaching, research and administrative areas had to be discussed in the Party Committee, and decisions were made by the Party Committee. The president was responsible for the implementation of those decisions. In “A Program for the Reform and Development of Chinese Education” (1993), Item 38, the principle of this system was restated as: “upholding the Party’s leadership of schools … ” This policy document further stipulates that “important issues must be discussed and decided by the Party Committee, while ensuring that administrative leaders can fully exercise their authority” (The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party & The State Council, 1993).

Of these five systems, only System I gave the president complete power to exercise academic and administrative management. Under this system, “administrative control was unblocked, the work was relatively efficient. Teaching and administrative work were carried out relatively smoothly ...” (Liu & Li, 1986, p.10). As some Chinese scholars have argued, in the period when the CCP had just taken over the government, this system also played a positive role in stabilizing and establishing normal order in institutions, and pushing the adjustment, reform and construction of institutions forward (Wang, 1986, p.18). It can be imagined that this system was criticised at the time because there was no proper supervision of the administrative management by the Party (Liu & Li, 1986, p.10).

This system was acceptable in the early years of the PRC, which was probably the only time when it could have been adopted. This is because the period 1949-56 was a special stage in the history of the China when, in the first three years, the CCP did not have control of the whole country and needed to solve various problems such as the remaining armed force of the Nationalist Party and bandits, the setting up of local governments, the reform of economic and educational systems and the Korean War. Following this, the Party’s attention moved to the socialist transformation of industry, commerce and handicraft and capitalist enterprises (The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 1987b, pp.304-305). Therefore, this period was in fact a transition period, when the socialist system had not yet been built up, and during which the CCP was gradually developing its organisation and consolidating its control over the whole country.

The situation in this special period must be taken into account when considering the development of Chinese higher education. It must be realised that the positive function of System I in academic and administrative management was not due to the CCP’s giving up power in higher education, but was the result of the CCP still being in the process of developing its leadership in higher education. In other words, as some Chinese scholars have pointed out, in this transitional phase the Party organisations in universities were not yet strong enough to take overall leadership in the management of universities (Liu & Li, 1986, p.2).

The following four systems were all under the leadership of the Party Committee. However these four systems can also be basically classified into two groups: Group A consisting of Systems II and IV and Group B consisting of Systems III and V. This classification is obviously characterised by the Party Committee in Group A taking more responsibility in management than in Group B. The idea of “laymen leading experts”, which means that the Party could supervise the educational experts in educational affairs, and more generally that the Party could lead the intellectuals in cultural and educational fields, was particularly a feature of System II (Wang & Ying, 1983a, p.228).

Under the systems in Group A, university presidents were not able to play an active role in academic and administrative management. Therefore, from an academic angle, the development of higher education and the improvement of educational quality were all negatively influenced. System IV, which was adopted in an unusual period—the Cultural Revolution, when all the normal managerial systems in universities were broken—was the extreme example of this (Wang & Ying, 1983a, p.228).

Under the systems in Group B, even though the basic structure under the leadership of the CCP did not change, the function of university presidents was emphasised more and the administrative system could operate more effectively. Consequently academic priorities featured more strongly in the development of higher education within Group B systems. System V, particularly, played a positive role in setting to rights systems that had been thrown into disorder during the period of the Cultural Revolution (Wang & Ying, 1983a, p.230).

If we put these changes into the general patterns of the two educational sub-models discussed above, the Academic Model advocates the president having more power in the academic and administrative management of the university, while the Revolutionary Model requires the Party Committee to take more responsibility for the university’s academic and administrative management in addition to its political and ideological work. Furthermore, we can see from the above that no matter which leadership system is in force, there are always two managerial lines which are represented respectively by the Party Committee and the president. The emphasis on one line or another depends upon shifts of emphasis between the two sub-models. Within either sub-model, however, the leadership of the Party Committee is the dominant one. This is a clear demonstration of the basic restrictions within the framework for higher education in China.
4. DUTIES OF ADMINISTRATORS IN UNIVERSITIES

The duties of administrators in universities demonstrate another aspect of the two sub-models, because the administrators must work to ensure that the institutions both keep to the socialist direction and develop academic work. This section looks at the specific duties of administrators—namely what they need to do in practical terms.

My assumption, in light of all the above, is that the duties of administrators in Chinese universities basically cover two areas: ideological work and professional work (academic and administrative management). Evidence to support my assumption may be found in The Principles of Higher Education, where apart from specifying the professional duties of university presidents, also stipulates that, “the president must, in light of the specific circumstances of teaching, research, and all the other administrative work, assist the Party Committee in the ideological work of all members including academic staff members, students, administrators and workers in the institution ...” (The Central Institute of Educational Administration, 1986, p.88).

Further evidence may be found in the “ Provisional Working Regulations for the President Responsibility System Practiced as the Experimental Internal Leading System in Beijing Normal University”. Four basic responsibilities of the president are listed. They are:

(a) to implement the principles and policies of the Party, and the laws and regulations of the state;
(b) to ensure the completion of teaching, research and other tasks, the continuous improvement of educational quality, and the improvement of academic and administrative work;
(c) in the light of the specific circumstances of teaching, research and administrative management, to conduct effectively ideological work with academic staff members, students, administrators and workers;
(d) to care for the welfare of all the academic staff members, students, administrators and workers, and make great efforts to improve their living conditions (Liu & Li, 1986, p.171).

The third of these responsibilities clearly sets out the president’s ideological duty. The same duty is undoubtedly given to lower level administrators as well.

The President Responsibility System, as an experimental leadership system in universities, was adopted in a small number of selected institutions following the Forum on the President Responsibility System held by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP and the Ministry of Education in November, 1984 (Liu & Li, 1986, p.8). “The Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CCP on the Reform of Education System” issued on 27th of May, 1985 also state: “The President Responsibility System will be step by step practiced in schools ...” (The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 1985).

The purpose of implementing this system was to allow the president to “function as the chief executive officer in institutional management as he had done in the early 1950s” (Du, 1992, p.26), or more specifically, to separate the duties of the Party Committee and the president so as to ensure that the president was fully responsible for overall teaching, research and administrative work in the institution and had the powers of both direction and policy-making in carrying out this work. As we can see from the Beijing Normal University’s “ Provisional Working Regulations” however, even though the duties of the Party Committee and the president were separated, and the president had become the person who was fully responsible for overall teaching, research and administrative work, he still could not be divorced from ideological work.

If we make a historical review of the CCP’s dogma in Mao Zedong’s works, we find that as early as 1957, Mao had already instructed that: “every department must take responsibility for ideological work. This responsibility should be taken by the Communist Party, the Communist Youth League, the responsible government departments, and still more by the presidents and teachers of schools” (Mao, 1977a, p.385).

The methods used by administrators in undertaking ideological work can be seen from the following examples cited in The Encyclopedia of Chinese Ideological Work. According to the Encyclopedia, the president of Liaoning University invited students to be his/her Liaison Officers in order to keep in contact with students and understand and solve their ideological problems, and the president of the North-East Institute of Technology regularly met students and talked with them. Meanwhile, the president of Shenyang University of Technology even went to students’ dormitories to live and eat together with students —this undoubtedly included a lot of informal discussions and heart-to-heart talks with students (Li, Cheng & Liu, 1990, p.1160). No specific dates for these examples are mentioned in the encyclopedia, however, as the article which contained such information was published in June 1990, and was a report summarizing the ideological work that had been done in Shenyang City since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (1978), it is clear that these examples must refer to the period from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s.

Let us now examine why administrators in Chinese universities must be responsible for ideological work alongside administrative work. First, to carry out ideological work in Chinese universities is regarded as a basic principle. Only by following this principle can the institution keep its socialist character and direction. To quote from The Principles of Higher Education, “insisting on the leadership of the CCP and the ideological work carried out by the Party in the institutions is a basic principle of our socialist higher educational work” (The Central Institute of Educational Administration, 1986,
The reason for this is that ideological work in China simply means that one must “use Communist ideology to educate people”, and that such work functions to “arouse their revolutionary consciousness and ensure that they keep to the correct stand and viewpoint” (Li & Bai, 1987, p.215). Ideological work is therefore the main means to ensure the “redness” which is required by the framework.

The book *Higher Education Management* gives a simple but even clearer statement of the function of ideological work: “strengthening ideological work is the fundamental guarantee of the university’s keeping its socialist character and direction” (Wang & Ying, 1983b, p.342). Thus, as they must first ensure the socialist direction of the institutions, administrators in Chinese universities undoubtedly need to discharge their ideological responsibilities.

Furthermore, in China, particularly in the pre-reform period before 1978, ideological work was also considered to be the most useful method for academic and administrative management. Under the leadership of the CCP, a very common understanding is that, so long as the people have a clear political goal, it does not matter what kind of professional work is done. This means that if people can connect their work with the CCP’s ideological goals, they will (according to the CCP’s logic) have the determination and courage to surmount difficulties. The following quotation from *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* shows this from the angle of students’ studies:

> For students to attach primary importance to a firm and correct political orientation not only does not conflict with their studies of science and culture; on the contrary, the higher the political consciousness they have, the more conscientiously and assiduously they will study science and culture for the revolution (Deng, 1994b, p.104).

Thus, based on the CCP’s logic, ideological work is an important principle in the management of universities, and putting it first ensures the completion of teaching, research and all other professional work (Zhu, Cai & Yao, 1983, p.47). In a more general sense, “ideological work is the fundamental guarantee of the completion of the basic tasks undertaken by the institutions of higher learning” (Wang & Ying, 1983b, p.343) because it is responsible not only for “redness”, but also for “expertise” (The Ministry of Education of People’s Republic of China, 1978, pp.401-402). All this shows that administrators in Chinese universities had, in fact, no choice but to undertake both professional and ideological duties.

5. **THE BASIC MODEL FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA**

To summarise the above discussion, the basic model of Chinese higher education during the period of the 1950s to the 1980s had the following features:

- **a)** an unbreakable framework, under the leadership of the CCP, maintaining both socialist-minded and professionally proficient aspects or, more simply both “redness” and expertise;
- **b)** a changing proportion of academic learning from time to time, corresponding to changes in the political situation;
- **c)** the absolute leadership of the CCP in a two line managerial structure, the involvement of the Party Committee in teaching, research and administrative work will vary depending on changes in the political situation;
- **d)** the undertaking, by administrators, of both professional and ideological duties.

In consideration of the above, we can clearly see that during the period of the 1950s to the 1980s, the Chinese higher educational model, apart from being dominated by a single official ideology, can be further divided into two sub-models, the Academic Model and the Revolutionary Model. These emphasised “expertise” and “redness” respectively. Chinese higher education fluctuated between these two sub-models, or in a more general sense, shifted between an emphasis on less political ideology and more political ideology. In terms of practical operations, in addition to requiring ideological work by university administrators, the pre-reform model was characterised by the CCP’s involvement, in different degrees, in all teaching, research and administration areas. This made Chinese universities essentially “an arm of the government” (Qiang, 2012, p.46).

In order to get a more general picture of the Chinese higher educational model during the pre-reform era, I will conclude by briefly examining what changes have taken place in China’s higher education since the 1980s. This will help to put the pre-reform model in a broader context of China’s educational development.

Changes since the CCP’s sweeping market-oriented reforms of the mid-1980s have been far-reaching. In a general sense, the impact of the reform process on China’s higher education can be seen from the adoption of modernisation as the main goal for educational development (Hayhoe, 1996, p.118). In the area of practical management, one of the significant changes, for example, was that universities were allowed to “make use of their human capital resources and capacities in science and technology to generate revenue themselves” (Min, 2004, p.70). Further to this, in the late 1990s, a policy orientation of the “industrialization of education” that aimed at “making the education sector an industry for moneymaking” also took shape (Ngok, 2007, p.145).

It must be noted however that the changes brought about by such reforms have not touched on the ideological and political foundation of China’s higher education. This view can be supported by the fact that the experimental leadership system—the president responsibility system...
of the early 1980s discussed above—was eventually replaced by the CCP’s traditional leadership system—the president responsibility system under the leadership of the Party Committee—in 1993. In 1998, this Party dominated leadership system for universities gained further endorsement by its recognition in the Higher Education Law (Item 39). The law took effect on 1st January 1999 and is still in effect today.

All this suggests that, since the 1990s, China’s higher education has, in a broad sense, followed a double-track path of promoting both ideological principles and professional as well as commercial measures. In considering this situation, it may be argued that, in the midst of reforms, the Chinese government, while pushing the professional and commercial development of China’s higher education, did not want to compromise on such fundamental issues as the absolute leadership of the Party (also see Qi, 2001, p.34). The only way to achieve this twofold goal was then to relax the control over the practical operation of Chinese universities, at the same time as further strengthening the political framework that the CCP has set for higher education.

In view of the changes that have occurred since the 1980s, we may say that the post-reform model for China’s higher education has functioned primarily in setting the political limits for the professional and commercial development of higher education in the course of China’s market-oriented reforms. In comparison with this political boundary-based model, the Chinese higher educational model during the period from the 1950s to 1980s could be identified as a management-oriented model. Not only did it set political limits but it also played an active role in informing the important managerial practices involved in the operation of Chinese universities.

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