The Effect of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) on Nigerian Federalism: An Examination Intergovernmental Management (IGM) 1999-2007

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Abstract
Federalism is a political mechanism for promoting unity-in-diversity in a heterogeneous society. The federal system through the IGR uses the IGM mechanism to provide understanding, cordiality balance and collaboration between and among units of government, and between government and the citizenry. In Nigeria’s federal relation, the IGR seems not to have facilitated the right harmonious interactions between and among the various units of government, and among groups. This has resulted in continued conflict and disharmony in some important areas of federal relation with its negative impact on the citizenry and the federal state. Hence this paper utilizing the documentary method examines the utilization of the IGM practice from 1999-2007 in IGR interactions in some areas of government interface in our federal system.

Key words: Federalism; Federal system; Collaboration; Conflict; Relations; IGR and IGM

INTRODUCTION

Federalism capsules heterogeneity with its appendage of complexities. It is designed to accommodate different units of government, diversity of social institutions and cultural formation that do not suit in fittingly or are easily amenable to a unitary system. It is a political organizational container concept that accommodates contrast and it is capable of responding and adjusting rightly to the variegate needs of group complexities and diversity with less dislocations if properly managed. That is why the federal system is favored by scholars and students alike to meet the demand for national unity for the whole, while at the same time allow individual communal groups to maintain their identity that is distinct from that of the whole. Evidently, federalism symbolizes a political philosophy of promoting diversity-in-unity with decentralization serving as its standing pillar.

Decentralization creates space for the devolution of power to subnational units. It provides the space for continued adjustment, compromise, and integration of divergent groups interest for better policy making, implementation and fiscal allocation. This is a necessary yet challenging process. It is challenging because the needs of the various groups are diverse and conflicting but represents their individually preferred interest for which they are not willing to compromise. And if need be, these individual variegated group interest must be reflected in the national development agenda. Remolding and balancing those diverse interest into a single policy framework for national action without undermining any group’s values requires adopting and utilizing the right mechanism that will confront, manage and resolve the challenges that do arise in the complex and challenging process of joint policy making, fiscal allocation and program implementation. The mechanism that makes this complex balancing possible is the IGM working within the framework of the IGR. The ability to capture diverse interests and balance appropriately into the national policy agenda makes federalism a distinctive paradigm of organization geared towards resolving the systemic contradiction of its distinct collectivities (Bassey, 2005, p. 29).

The IGR interactions subsumes four distinctive areas of federal-state-local interactions which are: a)
The evident character of these vast networks of interactions is complexity. Complexity is evident due to the marked difference between units which necessitate the need for collaboration between and among the different levels of government in Nigeria. Collaboration is a cooperative arrangement in which two or more parties sharing of know-how work jointly towards common goal.

1. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: ABSTRACTION, DIMENSIONS AND DYNAMICS

The I.G.R. is a system of transaction among managers in a hierarchically structured level of government. In a federal state, the IGR covers four distinctive areas which are: National-state-local, state-state, extra-governmental and non-governmental bodies’ interactions in a federal system. These four areas identified above mirror both the vertical and horizontal pattern of interaction within a federal state with public interest objectives (Olugbemi, 1980, p.11; Ayoade, 1980; Zimmerman, 1996; Galligan, et al. 1991; Ikelegbe, 2004). It is instructive to observe that we cannot talk about the IGR without emphasizing the important role of non-governmental (NGOs) in the policy process. Given the involvement of NGOs in the policy process the term IGR seems a bit outdated perhaps an inclusive term like inter-organizational relations should be apt (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2009, p.109). Central to the I.G.R theme, there are three models that feature prominently which are: Coordinate authority, inclusive authority and overlapping authority also referred to as partnership, principal/agent or the dual model (Bello-Imam, 2004, p.92).

Nigeria’s federalism capsules four distinct political decision making point (federal, state and local governments). In order to reduce conflict, engender peaceful cooperation and facilitate the development of the various subnational units without compromising national progress intergovernmental relations and management is not only germane but imperative. The Nigerian federal structure comprises of a central government, a federal capital territory (Abuja), 36 states and 774 local governments. Within this structure, sits different forms of relations comprising of federal-state-local, federal-state, state-state, state-local and local-local. The network of interactions between and among units of government and between government and NGOs is vast. These identified network of relationship interact through meetings, some of those meeting are conducted formally while others are informal. Formally, it is conducted through, the Federal Executive Council, National Council of States, Federal Character Commission, The National Council on Education and Health), The National Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (NRMAFC), National Boundary Commission, National Planning Commission, the Court, and the Legislature.

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Collaboration is effective when the parties involved have compatible goals. The major areas of collaboration are: Fiscal allocation, projects and program planning, policy determination, project and program distribution, and implementation. These choices are jointly made to ensure that all groups have a feel of national presence in their communities in accordance to minimum national standard (Ikelegbe, 2004; Aiyede, 2005).

In Nigeria, the unilateral usurpation and reshuffling of functions by the central government and the use of unfair fiscal allocation criteria or principles during military authoritarian regimes of past years had significantly undermined the value of the IGR and IGM in the working of the federal system (Aiyede, 2005, p.223). The centralizing character of military governing pattern that occasioned the oscillation and fragrant usurpation of responsibility without due recourse to the IGR and IGM mechanism had resulted in fiscal disequilibrium and functional dislocation of subnational units to be effective. This dislocation in the conduct federal relations not withstanding the I.G.R still is the workhorse of any federal system. It is the privileged instrument by which the job- whatever the job-gets done (Cameroun, 2001, p. 121). Given normal circumstances, there are five issue-areas in Nigeria’s federalism that reinforce the value of the IGR and IGM as essential instrument for the working of our federal system. These issue-areas are: The prominence of policy network, inclusion of all concerned governmental entities in projects and program implementation, attitudes and actions of implementing officials, the necessity of regular continuous day-to-day interaction among policy implementing and monitoring public officials, such as administrators and elected officials.

The ability of the IGR via the IGM to birth a productive engaging cooperative group effort in a seemingly discordant circumstance that earns these in tow mechanisms their dynamic character to facilitate the proper working of federalism. Hence, the IGR is a structure of interaction that is conditioned by events, developments, situations and other transient factors one primarily to federalism (Bello-Imman, 1995; Bello-Imman 1996, p.92). If the IGR is properly ordered and utilized it has the resilience to regulate and balance relationships and interactions despite considerable sharing of jurisdictions, shared action, programmes and problem-solution (Watt, 1970). The I.G.R is a mechanism for resolving conflict that often emerge the process of planning, distribution, financing and execution of programs and project in the polity. For the IGR to engender harmony and balance necessary for the achievement of the fundamental goals and objectives of statehood will require the adoption and utilization of an integrative managerial approach of the IGR which the IGM command (Popola, 2006, p.1; Marando & Florestano, 1998, p. 288).

2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT (IGM): MEANING, CHARACTER AND ISSUES FOR A FEDERAL STATE

The IGM mechanism is exercised within the IGR framework in a federal State. It is within this framework that the meaning, element, and value of the IGM can be understood and better appreciated. Though it is subsumed by the IGR its operation and impact has far reaching consequences for the federal state. IGM is the management and coordination of the relationships between governments for the purpose of achieving specific policy goal (Henry, 2007, p.349). It is the process by which the specified objectives are met (Marando & Florestano, 1992, p.296). The IGM is an emerging concept in the study of governmental interactions with specific emphasis on public officials, who work at the margin between their governments (Wright, 2007, p.508). Although they are not involve in deciding policy issues, they are however responsible for managing policy decisions and the daily fallouts that arise from governmental interactions.

The IGM mechanism provides administrators and groups the means and methods to resolve the issues that arise from group interaction in policy and programme design, and implementation. It is a vital instrument because diverse groups come to the policy table with different expectations for which if inappropriately attended to results in group discontent and conflict. This is essential because, for every policy issue there is a contest over conflicting, though equally plausible, conception of the same abstract goal or value for which the task of policy makers is to ‘reveal and clarify the underlying value disputes so that people can see where they differ and move toward reconciliation’ [Stone as cited in Bryner (2007, p.193)]. It is by performing this function that the IGM methodology permits the bridging of the political and administrative differences that often prolong or delay decision making and implementation.

Giving the finance challenge of the state and its impeding her ability to cope with growing public demands; self-help and voluntary actions are key elements for a successful society, and that government should be wary of eroding the potentials for such action (Beveridge, 1940). Hence, the IGM mechanism is able to facilitate inclusion of private hands in public policymaking, budgeting and implementation that allows the federal state to move progressively with a single focus toward achieving her national development agenda with less distortion and conflicts. Arising from this value-added character, the federal system derives the advantage of cost savings, fiscal easement, personnel easement, experimentation, lower political risk, image enhancement,
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The term IGM implies action with problem solving potentials to reform the intergovernmental system to make it more manageable (Mandell, 1979, p.2&6). It is a framework that is responsive to the transient nature of policy coalition with various networks established for a particular situation but dissolved when that situation changes or retained as conditions permits. This is because IGR interactions web around it largely autonomous participants with variable degrees of commitment and dependence on each other that incites the utilization of the inclusive approach of the IGM that allows the integration of diverse interest into one policy mold. The integrative character of the IGM allows the IGR interactions that crisscross horizontally-across multi-issues and vertically-down the intergovernmental chain (Radin, 2007, p.367). It is however argued that the kind of problems the IGM addresses does not eliminate major social problems nor do they lead to any substantial realignment in the federal system, albeit the IGM improve governance by fostering effective and efficient delivery of public service. This evidenced by the fact that behind the IGM literature lurks the suggestion of an ethic of good government. On this ground, IGM has a decidedly public administration flavor in its linkages of strategy and operation in the process of governance that allows the federal system to function properly (Agranof cited in Wright 2007, p.511).

3. AN INQUEST INTO THE APPLICATION OF THE IGM MECHANISM AND ITS IMPACT ON FEDERAL RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

In a federal state like Nigeria, there are three political decision-making points with multiple arenas for resource use and responsibilities requiring collaboration. If these arenas of interactions are not properly ordered by the IGM they make policy-making budgeting and implementation problematic and thorny. The resultant complexities have severe consequences for peaceful federal relations. In Nigeria, this complexity was birthed by military unilateralism and centralization of the federal system by seeking to the forceful application of uniform standards without regard to difference in regional resource endowment and socio-cultural variations that were not amenable to Unitarianism. This made proper collaboration between the federal, state and local governments on issues of governance conflictual. This unsavory situation, informed scholars like Ikelegbe observation that the IGM process in Nigeria as poorly utilized, not goal-oriented, un-programmed and non-integrative as the process seems to have no guiding ideology/philosophy, often it is too personalized, self-interest and epileptic (Ikelegbe, 2004, p.171). The lack of a unified perspective in the I.G.M mechanism may have been occasioned by inadequate definition of the objects and patterns of transactions.
which resulted in the lack of collaboration on overlapping jurisdictional dispersion programmes among disparate agencies and department. The absence of adequate coordinating machinery coupled with the piecemeal nature of I.G.R research are contributory factors that undermined Nigeria’s capacity to make the right progress (Olugbemi, 1980, p.115). That is not to say that

the distribution of power provokes a variety of disputes, between levels of government, between government at the same level, and between people (or peoples) and a government or governments. All such disputes, however, involve basic issues of constitutionalism: Definition and enforcements of limits upon governmental authority (Commelin, 2001, p.439).

In Nigeria’s case, the continued inability of the various units of governments to engender agreeable consensus on issues that have productive outcomes for the citizenry has become issue of public concern; as IGR interactions have reflected continued tensions.

There are two important dimensions of fiscal federalism: These are the assignment of responsibilities and fiscal allocation. These areas are direct the nature of policy–making, budgeting/fiscal allocation and implementation. To be specific, these areas of relations in the period under consideration in Nigeria have had their fair share of conflicts because of the various governments’ arbitrariness and disrespect for constitutionality. It is germane to observe that IGR practice during this period was characterized by conflicting relations among the executive and the legislature on the issue of budgeting, federal government versus state governments about the sharing of federal revenues, federal government and non-oil producing states versus oil producing on the issue of derivation and resources control, the state governments and local governments on the issue of state-local governments joint account.

Due to the imbalance in the system the judicial decision of the Supreme Court could not prescribed a one-fit-all-solution to end the contentions rather it further complicated the issue of fiscal relations. This was evident in the increasing call for resources control by some section of the country. In all, fiscal relations have remained the most contentious in Nigeria.

much as the judgment may have resolved a number of outstanding legal matters pertaining to the demands of the southern governors for resource control, though not to the total satisfaction of all the parties involved in the suit, it has even more fundamentally, made clear the necessity of devising creative political solutions, as a complement to the imperative of legality, in the resolution of some of the most persistent problems associated with the Nigeria brand of federal system of government (Jega, 2007, p.205).

The inability of the Supreme Court judgment of April 5, 2002, to mitigate the heightened fiscal discontent that a political negotiation was instituted between the federal government and the oil-producing states to correct the legal complication that the judgment had generated. In the first place, political negotiation should have preceded judicial engagement in resolving the problem. However, given that the federal government wanted to continue to maintain the status-quo it had inherited form previous regime it sidelined the meditative-negotiative process of the IGM and rather opted for a judicial solution to resolve the heated fiscal allocation issue. Even though the federal government was latter forced to adopt a political solution to the on shore-offshore dichotomy as a way of containing the continuing agitation over the issue in the Niger Delta yet the issue remained unsettled (Aiyede, 2005, p.229). To some the issue remained unresolved because of the federal government high-headiness in handling the matter of derivation. This failure aggravated militant attack that continued to disrupt oil production activities due to the destruction of oil and gas installations and facilities, kidnapping of oil workers and hostage-taking (Duru, 2009, pp.256-257; Maja-Pearce, 2013, p.63).

Politics is in part about influencing the sharing of power through the process of discussion, bargaining and compromise in an inclusive manner (Webber, 1947, Laswell, 1930, Anifowose, 1999). It should not be a by-product resorted to when conflicting situation erupts but an integral character of socio-political relations. At the heart of the political solution lies the IGM tools of negotiation, bargaining, persuasion and compromise for which the political process in Nigeria has been unable to appropriately utilize to effectively resolve the problem differences and distrust occasioned by improper engagement of the collective in the governance process (Waldt, 2001, p.91). This failure had given rise to subversive forces like group militancy, kidnapping in the Niger delta other like-form criminality across the Nigerian geographical space (Maja-Pearce, 2013, p.63). This untoward situation continues to terrorize the federal state, the citizenry and would be international investors. In a bid to find a final solution to the question of militancy that had undermined oil production and by extension federal revenue, the federal government under president Obasanjo resorted to the use of force which saw the demolition Udi community in Bayelsa state. The use of brutal force by a democratic government to quell a civil misunderstanding is indicative of government inappropriate utilization of the IGM approach which the political solution sought to utilize in solving the problem.

Relating to item (ii) the contention is tied to the desire by federal government to stop over-zealous state governments from the arbitrary and unconstitutional poaching on constitutionally recognized LGs funds to finance their political motivated but unconstitutional LGs latter renamed development areas. The diversion of constitutionally recognized local governments’ (see the First Schedule, Part (1) for a comprehensive list of constitutionally approved LGs in Nigeria) funds resulted in their inability to perform their basic minimum function
for the people in their localities. It is sad to note that in Kaduna state, the state government had to intervene to perform the function of refuse disposal on the behalf of local government. Equally saddening to note is the fact that due to such diversion of funds, Kaduna North and South local governments could not pay the salaries of their staff for six months (Bello, 2005). It is necessary to note that the creation of local government as a third tier government by the 1976 reform was to allow the rural populace share fully in the development process through equitable access to resources, inputs and services by participating in the design and implementation of development programmes (Asogwa, 2010, p.55). But, due to state government poaching on LG funds and imposition, these lofty objective is compromised. This has significantly occasioned conflict between them and state governments (Ikeanyibe, 2009, p.316).

The non-engagement of the people coupled with the abysmal performance of LGs across Nigeria is reflected in the poor conditions of the localities. This sorry situation which was unconstitutional informed the then President Obasanjo decision to withhold the funds (zero allocation) of local governments to the states involved in such illegality. It is apposite to note that the disagreement was not due to the creation of these so-called local government or development areas but the diversion of the funds of constitutionally established local government funds to finance illegal institutions. The zero allocation was to stop such refractions [Lagos, Kaduna and Kano states are a case in point]. The later decision by the Obasanjo’s administration to make direct allocation of funds to the LGs was not only morally right but was welcomed by the local people. The intention was to safeguard the autonomy of those LGs as well as strengthen their capacity to improve the socio-economic conditions of the rural populace. This action by the federal government, although applauded by people was seen by affected state governors as an attack on their authorities; much more so, a meddling by the federal government in their internal affairs. The argument supporting state interference in local government affair by those governors was that the 1999 federal constitution empowered the states that LGs are a creation of state governments. This authority has been used by the states to the disadvantage of local governments.

The increase in the minimum wage of civil servants for which the federal, states and labour unions were part of the negotiation latter became another thorny issue in state-federal relations. Some see the enactment of the new minimum wage as a form of imposition which the ideal of the IGM. This view may not be true, because the enactment of the minimum wage was the culmination of long period of interface between the various labour unions and the state. Hence the outcry by the state that they were not fully involved only evidenced their lack of sincerity. The governors’ argument that the decision of the federal government to raise minimum wage without a corresponding increase in federal allocation to finance such increment did not take into consideration its implication on the finances of the states was dainty. The whole contention now boiled down to lack of consultation with the states. If such consultation had taken place the federal government would have been intimated of the states inability to finance the increased wage bill and still maintain the provision of other essential services (James & Akintola, 2012, pp.134-135). This argument was however not true, it was only a crafty and deceptive tactic by the state government to see if they can stampede or cajole the federal government to increase their revenue allocation share or possibly alter the revenue sharing formula in their favour.

Another area of presumed poor-utilization of the IGM mechanism between organs of the federal government can be seen in the way federal budgeting had been conducted in constant disagreement. The federal budget mirrors in a nutshell the sum-total of the various governments policy choice expected to be implemented if legitimized a specified time. Given the sensitivity of the budget document it is expected that there should be a constant liaison between the executive and the legislature from its initiation to implementation unfortunately that was not the case. The lack of liaison between the legislature and the executive at the federal and state level had often resulted in unnecessary tussle and disagreement as to what the total budgetary sum should be. Such twist and turns coupled with the accompanying bickering had resulted in budget approval delay with consequence for poor implementation. Equally related to challenging the process was the desire by some members of the executive to conceal the padding of their budgeted estimates while for the legislature, it was the desire to have a fair share of the loot concealed in the padded budget estimate. It was for this reasons that the budget document both at the federal and state level was eclipsed by acrimony.

Consequently, the annual budget was subjected to many amendments during its life, in effect, it was often difficult to know what the approved budget was, and what was being implanted (Abubakar & Okongwu, 2008, p.252). The growing acrimony over the budget between the two arms of government evidenced the absence of proper interface and partnership necessary to balance the budget in order to effect speedy approval and proper implementation. It is widely acknowledged that no other issue has in the past seven years generated much conflict between the National Assembly and the executive as the appropriation exercise (Okanya, 2009, p.134). The upshot of this kind of continued bickering only mirrored the inappropriate use of the IGM mechanism that had resulted in the abuse of due process and the deepening of fiscal conflict.
Due to the lack of collaboration some ministers engaged themselves in bribing legislators to ensure that their padded budget estimates were not tempered with by the legislators. The revelation of this unwholesome act occasioned the dismissal of one federal minister Fabian Osuji during this period. The federal minister protested his sack, saying that such behaviours were common to all levels of government. The members of education committees of the two houses were indicted while the senate president, Wabara later resigned after president Obasanjo accused him of accepting #15 million bribe from the sacked minister (Onyishi & Eme, 2009, p.180). This unwholesome act would have been absolutely unnecessary in a situation where there had been the appropriate utilization of the IGM tools.

The essence of adopting and maximizing the utility of the IGM methodology is to breed healthier federal relations. Its full application does not necessarily eradicate conflict but it does minimize it. Through the use of negotiation, dialogue and consensus building as means of handling political conflict there is the acceptance of opposing dissent voices that often emerge in IGR (Ibeanu & Egwu, 2007, p.13). Such acceptance generates openness, and openness engenders understanding and public acceptability thereby legitimizes government. The IGM is to engender understanding as matters are at least brought to the table for open for deliberation and consensus-building by parties concerned. The capacity of all concerned to go through the motion of participating in deciding on issue of public relevance enhances better understanding and collaboration for development.

It is process is necessary, given that some units of government i.e. local governments alone cannot with their meager funds meet public demands in their locality alone. This inability makes it mandatory to incorporate other contributing hands in functional relationship so as to facilitate the execution of local projects and programs. This kind of participatory governance that embraces social actors in shaping and determining public policy creates a lively and productive synergy between civil and political society (Ackerman, 2002 as cited in Ibeanu and Egwu, 2007, p.13). On the contrary however, the disposition of state governments to superimpose candidates has eroded the local government the viable opportunity to benefit from this kind of beneficial public-private partnership. Similarly, imposition often erode the citizens of those local entities the opportunity of electing the right leaders whose purpose of governing does not have policy dichotomy with that of the people’s needs (Onah, 1995, p.49). These factors have not only combined to undermine the autonomy but render local government ineffective in Nigeria.

The IGM mechanism allows governance at all levels to draws on broad strategies of resource mobilization and utilization across the public-private boarder. The focus on civil society and other organizations involvement in governance process typify the expansion of the democratic space. Similarly, the relationship with groups provides veritable source of ideas, legitimation and feedback for government from its society. It is also makes administration less remote from the citizens (Guy & Pierre, 2007, p.3). This integrative approach to governance directs and tailors development in line with popular demand, while eradicating the forceful application and consumption of public goods on the whole community. The act of involvement is indicative of the value government has for the divergent groups represented. By this inclusiveness and integration, civil society and the people see developmental initiative and governance as their own; as such, do not only pay special attention to ensure they succeed but correspondingly protect whatever project located in their to their communities. This form of state-citizen linkage promotes the building of civil society, foster participatory democracy, encouraging facilitative democracy, and empower participatory governance for citizens. As it is expected that the problem of elitist nature of democratic institutions and their lack of accountability can be overcome through building vibrant robust civil society that can mobilize citizens to make claims, play a watchdog role and serve as a countervailing power against the state. In this way, it is possible to promote the interface of the tripod of state, civil society and the private sector while simultaneously strengthening the supply side of the state and the demand side of civil society (Ibeanu & Egwu, 2007, pp.12-13).

This amiable political environment enables productive human enterprise to thrive; which in turn bolster national development. Equally too, this form of engagement is essential because the constitution cannot spell out all relations in a federal system and that the division of duties and responsibilities cannot be absolute (Okoli & Onah, 2002, p.257). In which case, public administration functions are so mixed that collaboration rather than competition is crucial and inevitable to move the federal state forward. This invoke that a strong need for federal–state interactions in respect of practically every aspect of governmental work and a consequential increase in the number and frequency of meetings and conferences involving political actors and administrators (Okoli & Onah, 2002).

It is however noticeable that in such meetings, representatives of the federal government seek assume leader role. This posture contradicts Wheare’s (1953) theoretical ideal of federalism which postulates that each unit to be coordinate to one another (Okoli & Onah, 2002, p.256). The unwillingness of federal officials to be coordinate in status with subnational officials has unleashed and exacerbated the problems of competing loyalty and power relation (Okoli, 2004, p.297) that has deepened the divide in IGR interactions.

The inappropriate use of the IGM tools in some instances as observed above has over the years deprived...
ordinary Nigerians the benefits living in a polity with less strain and conflicts. The less than appreciable utilization of the IGM mechanism to resolve the governance and relational issues in Nigeria’s federal system is not due to government’s ignorance of its value. Its refraction is however a conscious and crafty design by the various units of government to protect their special interest which continues to give them special advantages in IGR interactions. For the federal government, her interest is to perpetuate the centralization of fiscal resource. This gives her a towering control and capacity to manipulate and influence the political behaviours of subnational governments in Nigeria. On the part of the states, the presence of the clause that states that local governments are product of their creation have been used by the state government under the guise of enforcing external control to interfere in affairs of LGs as well as poach on their meager funds. This unlawful act is easily committed through the State-local government joint account (Roberts, 1997, p.63 & 1999, p.258).

On the whole, the deliberate desire of the various tiers of government not to properly account to the citizenry has made them to underplay the effective application of the IGM methodology in IGR interactions. By this refraction, it has resulted in the negation of the purpose of government, which is, the conscious management of the public resources for the common good. Focusing on protecting the common good is reinforced by popular participation, accountability and transparency (World Bank as cited in Ibeanu & Egwu, 200, p.16). The less than appreciable use of the IGM mechanism during this period had severely undermined collaboration, genuine compromise and consensus-building necessary for integrating appropriately the interest of the different units of government, the various governments and the citizenry, and between the different ethnicities. This is essential for to reducing significantly the barrage of socio-economic and political conflicts currently undermining development and Nigeria’s federalism. These have not helped us to build the caliber of supportive constituencies required to resist a determined effort to upstage it (Kayode, 2007, p.68).

This is due to leadership suciism and insensitivity in dealing with the issue-areas that are of public concern in an open and beneficial manner to every Nigerian. By this less than appreciable effort, the government is unable to effectively incorporate and meet the needs of the various groups in Nigeria. This is a snub on the operator of state power as they had failed to order things right. Under this environment, it is impossible to have a pattern of IGR that will permit the federal system to transcend peacefully so as to impact positively on the citizenry. All other efforts at state transformation without putting this aspect of state relations in order is like coupling a machine without the right nuts and bolts; the result is that system preform optimal.

CONCLUSION

The inability of the government to incorporate the IGR interactions the IGM mechanism have deter the ability of the different tiers of government to make a major refocusing at confronting the modern problems of managing the contemporary federal system (Marando & Florestano, 1992, p.309). The capacity of IGR to resolve emerging conflicts and disagreements in a harmonious manner such that it will impact positively on the competence of the various constitutionally limited governments is placed on the anvil of the IGM. The capacity of the IGM to manage the divergences that results from the daily fallout of relationships will depend on how the IGM mechanisms are truly utilized in a manner perceived to be open and without compulsion.

Utilizing the IGM mechanism appropriately is an indispensable building-block for not only promoting understanding but make the IGR interactions both participatory and fruitful. It also diminishes the formal command and control pattern of relationships that undermined easy resolution of conflicts, quick determination of policies and speedy program implementation. It is valuable instrument for strengthening the alliance between program specialist and professionals that transcend levels of government they serve. The IGM allows the inclusion of private hands in the governance process which hitherto were excluded and it did not allow the IGR to connect well with the new experiential realities of federal governance. Entrenching the utilization of IGM mechanism in IGR interactions is the basis for building a lasting understanding and trust between the various tiers of government and civil society in governance process. This will stimulates genuine and not pseudo participation in governance as role differentiation is understood and adhered to in accordance with the dictate of the rule of law. Adhering to the IGM mechanism will significantly help in stabilizing the polity and guarantee the use of public resource for the benefit of the people.

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