

## From AMIS to UNAMID: The African Union, the United Nations and the Challenges of Sustainable Peace in Darfur, Sudan

## DE LA MUAS A LA MINUAD: L'UNION AFRICAINE, L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES ET LES DEFIS DE LA PAIX DURABLE AU DARFOUR, AU SOUDAN

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### Abstract

Since, 2003 when hostilities broke out in Darfur region of Western Sudan, the African Union has been leading international community efforts at restoring peace to this trouble region. The organization deployed ceasefire monitoring commission, peacekeeping force and under Nigeria leadership broker peace agreement between the warring parties. From all indications the Darfur Peace Accord [DPA], brokered in Abuja, Nigeria has not resulted into the normalization of the security and political situation in Darfur as was envisaged. The apparent lack of robust capacity by the African Union Mission, AMIS to stabilize the security situation in Darfur reinforces the call for the United Nations to intervention. With a robust mandate, secure resource base and better logistic capabilities, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur, UNAMID has been proactive in enhancing the protection of its personnel, bases and equipments and greater capacity in the provision of security for safe delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians. Much as the deployment of UNAMID mission has brought semblance of security, there continue to exist challenges that are undermining security and militating against the achievement of durable peace in Darfur this paper argued.

**Key words:** African Union; Conflict; Darfur; Peacekeeping; Security

### Résumé

Depuis 2003, lorsque les hostilités ont éclaté dans la région du Darfour au Soudan occidental, l'Union africaine a dirigé les efforts de la communauté internationale à

rétablir la paix dans cette région trouble. L'organisation a déployé commission de suivi cessez-le-maintien de la paix la force et sous la direction du Nigeria courtier accord de paix entre la guerre parties. de toutes les indications de l'Accord de paix sur le Darfour [DPA], négocié à Abuja, au Nigeria ne s'est pas traduite dans la normalisation de la situation sécuritaire et politique au Darfour comme cela a été envisagé. le manque apparent de forte capacité par la Mission de l'Union africaine, la MUAS à stabiliser la situation sécuritaire au Darfour renforce l'appel à l'Organisation des Nations Unies à l'intervention. Avec un mandat robuste, base de ressources en sécurité et de meilleures capacités logistiques, l'Union africaine-Nations Unies au Darfour, la MINUAD a été proactif dans le renforcement de la protection de son personnel, des bases et des équipements et une plus grande capacité dans la fourniture de sécurité pour une livraison sûre de l'aide humanitaire et la protection des civils. Tout comme le déploiement de la mission de la MINUAD a apporté un semblant de sécurité, il continuera d'exister défis qui minent la sécurité et milite contre la réalisation d'une paix durable au Darfour a fait valoir ce document.

**Mots-clés:** Union Africaine; Les conflits; au Darfour; Maintien de la paix; De sécurité

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### INTRODUCTION

The needs to ensure peace, stability and peaceful co-existence between States and among people of the world informed the formation of the United Nations after the end of World War II. Since, its formation this premier

international organization has been in the forefront of international efforts directed at preventing breach of peace and maintaining global peace and security. Whether, in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the globe, thousands of peacekeepers and resources devoted to peace keeping and other related peace missions attested to the commitment of the UN to ensure world peace and security.

Notwithstanding its pre-eminent position in preventing threats to global peace and security especially, through the deployment of peacekeeping and peace support operations, other regional organizations do take actions directed at maintaining peace and ensuring security. In fact Chapter VIII of the Charter establishing the United Nations supports such actions by regional organizations<sup>1</sup>. The need for actions to prevent breach of peace and ensure regional security has informed the deployment of peacekeeping and peace support operations by the defunct Organization of African Unity. The organization deployed peacekeeping missions to Chad (1981-1982), and Rwanda (1990-1993), before being transformed to the African Union. Though, the success of such operations was hampered by mirage of factors yet the deployment of these missions attested to the resolve of then OAU to mediate in conflicts on the continent<sup>2</sup>.

Given such antecedents it was not surprising that the nascent African Union did not shy away when confronted with the crisis in Darfur. Lacking the commitment and the needed political will to intervene directly, the international community placed the responsibility to stop the carnage in Darfur on the African Union. Inspired by the notion of 'African Solution to African Problem', the African Union through its Peace and Security Council deployed a ceasefire monitoring commission and peacekeeping mission to Darfur. The organization under Nigeria's leadership also mediated a peace agreement between the warring parties at Abuja, Nigeria.

With a ceasefire commission, (CFC); peacekeeping mission, (AMIS); a peace agreement, (DPA), the African Union has played critical roles in stabilizing the Darfur region of Sudan. The African Union through AMIS has done much to provide security in Darfur, particularly in areas where it had troop presence. AMIS has come along way since it was established. Indeed, the AU needs to be commended for stepping into Darfur when international community commitment was not forthcoming. It is to the credit of the AU that it has managed to pull together a mission that has provided a semblance of order and stability with little and belated international assistance. However, with a continued deteriorating security situation since early 2006, the incapability of AMIS to curtail the crisis in Darfur has become clearly visible. Nothing shows AMIS inability to manage the situation than the fact that its troops and personnel have become a prominent target of attacks from parties to the conflict. Such attacks while

altering the security dynamics also erodes the credibility of AMIS among Darfurians facing increasing insecurity.

The apparent failure of the African Union mission to curtail the crisis in Darfur, epitomized by the worsening security situation has necessitated the call for the United Nations to take-over the AU mission. The logic behind the call was that the UN given its experience and resource base will be able to succeed where the African Union has failed. Informed by the prevailing political and security situation in Darfur, the United Nations Security Council in July 2007 authorized the deployment of a joint African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur, UNAMID. Given its mandate, resource base and logistic capabilities, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur, UNAMID has demonstrated proactive ability to protect its personnel, bases and equipments and greater capacity in providing necessary security for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians in Darfur. Much as the deployment of UNAMID mission has brought semblance of security, there continue to exist challenges that are undermining security and militating against the achievement of durable peace in Darfur this paper contends.

## GENESIS OF THE CRISIS IN DARFUR

An analysis of the genesis of the present conflict in Sudan's Northwestern region of Darfur will be totally incomplete without a general overview of the history of crisis and conflict in Sudan (UN, 2005, p.17). Indeed, the struggle for self-determination, equity and development by the people of Southern Sudan against successive regimes and power elites from the North can be said to have ginned the struggle of other marginalized people and regions from the peripheral north (Malwal, 1991, p.117-119). Presently it can be asserted that, while the struggle by the south form the genesis of the crisis in the Sudan, the crisis has become complex and intricate given the spate of hostilities in other regions in the north.

The crisis tearing post-colonial Sudan apart today actively started with the military mutiny of August 1955 at Torit, Southern Sudan. The mutiny, which later spread an orgy of violence against Northerners throughout the Southern Sudan, was ginned by the perceived psychological fear of Northern domination after independence by Southerners. Such fears were understandable given the marked disparities and inequality between the two Sudan in virtually every facet of human endeavours (Deng, 1974, p.5-15). The violence was finally put under control, and Sudanese unite behind the declaration of independence in 1956. However, the mutiny led to rebellion that latter escalated into full-blown civil war between successive regimes in Khartoum and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. While the first phase of the war ended with the negotiation and

signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972, the regime of General Jafa'ar Nimeiri was to latter weakened the agreement and it abrogation a decade after led to the resumption of hostilities (Deng, 1998, p.1). Peace was finally achieved between the North and the South with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement [CPA], in December 2005. The agreement provided for the holding of a referendum by South Sudan people to determine whether they will remain in a united Sudan or become an independent country. The independence referendum was held between 9 and 15 January 2011 with South Sudanese overwhelmingly voting for separation from Sudan. On July 9 2011 the new state of South Sudan was proclaimed with its capital at Juba.

The racial, religious and cultural division between the Arabized and Islamized North and the majority Animist South aptly referred to as the 'Southern Problem', was indeed the problem of the whole of Sudan (Aliyu, 2005, p.164-174; Malwal, 1991, p.117). This racial division of Sudan between Arabized and Islamized Northerners and Animist African Southerners was nothing but an oversimplification of the Afro-Arab racial mixture of Sudan and that simplification was over-reified in the popular narration and discourse of the conflict in Darfur (Hassan, 2010, p.21). While a majority of Sudanese in the North represents an Islamized Arab mold, there is a considerable non-Arab population indigenous to the North. Indeed, as Deng (1998, p.4), pointed out and as current realities have shown majority of the ethnic groups in Darfur are certainly Negroid and non-Arab. The Nuba of Southern Kordofan are little touched by Arabism and are mostly non-Muslim. In the same vein the Nubian that had the longest history of contact with Arab being Egyptian neighbour still retained their language and was intensely proud of their Nubian identity. The same thing can be said of the Beja's in the Northeast.

Thus the North-South racial dichotomy and identity crisis that has come to characterize the politics of Sudan and shaped its history of conflict, was never an issue limited to North-South relations alone. It is a national issue, as the crisis over identity coupled with long history of marginalization, neglect and underdevelopment has ignited conflicts between the power elite in Khartoum and the people of the peripheral regions of Northwestern and Northeastern Sudan. Thus, the conflicts in Sudan can be said to revolve around the crisis of identity, on which the history of political domination and exclusion, unfavourable policies and uneven development had come to shape. These have made Sudan to emerge and remained as Africa's premier land of complex and intricate conflict (Saka and Omede, 2005, p.378; Deng, 1998, p.2).

The root of the present conflict in Darfur like that of the south is complex and intricate. Ethnic animosities, environmental stress, drought, famine and desertification, the issue of land ownership and access to land based

resources, availability of light weapons were important issues that ignited the conflict. These coupled with Khartoum deliberate policy of arming and co-opting the Arab groups in its war with the south and other disgruntled element in Darfur, deep seated grievances relating to identity crisis and governance issues and the emergence of armed oppositions noted as African have come to be the major factors fuelling and shaping the conflict. The conflict can be said to have stemmed from cumulative effects of long years of neglect, marginalization, competing economic interests and political polarization that engulfed the region due to Khartoum's manipulating policies (Hassan, 2010, p.22; UN, 2005, p.22; Saka and Omede, 2005, p.379). The nature of the conflict may be new, however it is nothing but the latest manifestation of a simmering but long neglected protracted conflict. The conflict has now turned from intermittent and low-level groups' violence to a full-blown armed conflict in which the government in Khartoum and its allies groups were pitched against armed rebels groups in Darfur.

## NATURE AND PHASES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DARFUR'S CRISIS

The seeds of the present crisis in Darfur have been planted much earlier. The devastating drought and famine of 1980s, which destroyed the region fragile ecology was what set the stage for clashes between mainly black African farmers and Arabized nomadic communities of Darfur all Muslim by religious affiliation. This coupled with long-term neglect, political marginalization, socio-economic underdevelopment, availability of light weapons and Khartoum discriminating policies was what destroyed the delicate centuries old shred of ethnic co-mingling and turned Darfur to a burning region (Refugees, 2004, p.9). According to United Nations High Commission for Refugees (Refugees, 2004, p.3), the sign of the present conflict had been there for sometime but had gone unnoticed. Against repeated warning from humanitarian agencies, the international community failed to respond until the crisis and its humanitarian disaster attained an alarming proportion.

The present intense and full-blown conflict in Darfur was ignited in 2003 when the Sudan Liberation Movement [SLA], formerly Darfur Liberation Front [DLF], launched its first major offensive on El-Fashir the historic capital of Darfur, looting armoury, destroying aircrafts at the El-Fashir airport and attacking government targets (ICG, 2004, p.1; Human Rights Watch, 2004, p.4). The Justice and Equity Movement [JEM] later joined the SLM/A in the conflict. These two earlier groups hinged their rebellion on perceived discrimination and marginalization by the Arab regime in Khartoum against the people of Darfur (Chin and Morgenstern, 2005, p.1). Faced with

increasing rebels attacks the government in Khartoum decided to combat the insurgency by ethnically cleansing the groups that made up the rebels support base (Refugees, 2005, p.6; Saka and Omede, 2005, p.380-386; Cohen, 2006).

The intense and savagely conducted battle, which has been raging in Darfur since early 2003, has affected almost all of Darfur population. Those that were not affected directly as a result of attacks on villages, killing, rape, looting, destruction of property and forced displacement, were indirectly affected as a result of the collapse of the region's economy, ecology and society (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p.2). The conflict has displaced more than two million people as either refugees in Eastern Chad or internally displaced persons [IDPs] in camps across Darfur. In the same vein more than 400,000 people have been killed, while countless numbers were maimed, assaulted, raped and sexually molested. The savagery that characterized the conduct of the conflict particularly from the government side has led to the destruction of the ethnic balance and ecology on which the population of Darfur depends (ICG, 2004, p.1).

While initial deployment of the African Union Mission in Sudan [AMIS], peacekeepers led to a reduction in violent attacks against civilian population, the mission was unable to maintain such momentum. The mirage of problems encountered by the mission largely reduced its deterrence value (Chin and Morgenstein, 2005, p.2). Worst still the AU mediated Darfur Peace Agreement [DPA] did not enjoy widespread acceptance. Of all the rebel groups present at Abuja, Nigeria it was only the Minni Minnawi's faction of SLM/A that accepted and signed the agreement. This left SLM Abdul Wahid Nour's faction and JEM as non-signatories, this has meant that the agreement lack the needed majority support for its speedy implementation. In view of this, the political resolution of the conflict should not be expected soon. The fragmentation of the rebel movements coupled with the aforementioned issues led to rise in violent attacks and banditry all directed at civilian population of Darfur. The attacks and the worsening of humanitarian situation necessitated the call for the United Nations to take over the peace process in Darfur.

## THE DARFUR CONFLICT AND THE AFRICAN UNION INVOLVEMENT

For too long, the preferred approach of the international community to the crisis in Darfur, Sudan has been characterized by tough rhetoric accompanied by half measures and inaction (Oluwadare, 2011, p.188). The general lack of commitment and political will to actively intervene has ensured that continued and widespread attacks against civilians and humanitarian aid workers and delivery have been carried out with relative immunity in Darfur. Most Western States have justified their failure

to be actively involved by citing an array of diplomatic, bureaucratic and political hurdles constraining their strong involvement (Oche, 2009; ICG, 2005, p.1).

Given the lack of the needed commitment to respond and actively intervene in Darfur, the international delegated the responsibility to normalize the situation in Darfur to the African Union reinforcing the slogan of 'African Solution to African Problem' (Chin and Morgenstein, 2005, p.1). Since, 2004 when the nascent African Union has wielded into the crisis it has remained the lead international player. Demonstrating its strong commitment, the African Union took the initiative to establish the political negotiations both in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and later in Abuja, Nigeria. It also put up the ceasefire commission and the ceasefire monitoring force, the African Union Mission in Sudan [AMIS]. The AU involvement has turned out to be a mixed blessing for civilians in Darfur. Initially the AU provided the needed rapid response when Western and international commitment was not forthcoming, however, the organization lacked the capacity, resources and ultimately the political will to hold the parties accountable to their commitments as contained in the various agreements they have endorsed. More glaringly the AU mission lack the capability to improve significantly the security situation in Darfur worsening security situation throughout the region (ICG, 2006b, p.14; Human Rights Watch, 2006, p.35-36; Saka, 2006, p.138-139).

## AFRICAN UNION AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN DARFUR

Efforts aimed at finding solution to the Darfur crisis by interested parties from within the African continent commenced as far back as 2003. The first of such political process was the Abeche mediation led by the Chadian President Idress Derby. The Abeche effort led to the signing of the Abeche ceasefire agreement on 3 September 2003. The agreement committed parties to a ceasefire, control of irregular armed groups, the release of prisoners of war and detainees, cantonment of the SLA forces and establishment of a tripartite commission to oversee its implementation (ICG, 2004a, p.26). The Abeche agreement quickly collapsed due to the violation of its provisions by parties' signatories to the agreement, most especially the government and its allied militias.

The deadlock of the Chadian mediated peace process and the continued worsening of humanitarian situation in Darfur prompted the African Union intervention. After series of mediated talks, the parties reached a new ceasefire agreement at N'djamena, Chad. The agreement was followed upon by peace talks between the parties in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia under the mediation of the African Union. The agreement in Addis Ababa on security and humanitarian issues were meant to complement and

strengthen the N'djamena ceasefire agreement. From N'djamena and Addis Ababa, the political peace process moved to Abuja, Nigeria where representatives of the government of Sudan and rebel groups met to discuss modalities on how to put an end to the conflict. The Abuja process under African Union mediation team focused largely on four important issues, which are: humanitarian, security, political, and socio-economic issues underpinning the conflict (ICG, 2005, p.10-14).

After much deliberation, representatives of the Sudan government and the rebel groups signed the Abuja protocols on humanitarian and security issues. These protocols largely reinforce earlier agreement particularly the N'djamena ceasefire agreement. The signing of these protocols was followed by series of negotiation on the thorny issues of political representation and power sharing; wealth sharing; compensation for victims of the conflict; reconstruction of Darfur and other key socio-economic issues. After series of intense negotiation spanning nearly two years, the parties in Abuja under intense international pressure signed the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006. The key components of the final DPA includes: Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing, a Comprehensive Ceasefire, final Security Arrangements, a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation Conference, a Reconstruction Fund among others (Jooma, 2006, p.6). However, a major weakness of the agreement was that the representatives of the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/ Minni Minnawi Faction were the signatories to the agreement. The remaining two rebel groups present at the Abuja talk, Sudan Liberation Movement/Abdul Wahid Nur Faction and the Justice and Equity Movement refused to ratify the agreement arguing that the agreement contained shortcomings and that it failed to meet their demands (ICG, 2006a, p.1; Jooma, 2006, p.7).

The non-ratification of the Abuja agreement by JEM and the SLM/Abdul Wahid Nur faction and the decision of the international community to forged ahead with its signing clearly shows the impatience with which the peace talks was conducted (Jooma, 2006, p.9). The hurried nature of the peace talks, non-signing by the aforementioned groups and shortcomings inherent in the agreement itself has made some observers to argue that it was an agreement doomed to fail from the start (Hassan, 2010, p.23; Reeves, 2006, p.1). Given the inability to buy the non-signatory groups into the agreement, the continued fragmentation of the rebels front, increasing violence, the allegation that the AU is bias to the non-signatory groups by these groups and Darfuran in refugee and displaced persons camps and the lack of commitment to implement the text of the DPA by the government of Sudan seriously undermined the peace agreement.

## AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR

The African Union Mission in Sudan [AMIS] was deployed in July 2004 to monitor an AU brokered N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement between the initial two rebel groups and the government of Sudan. Given continued violence the mission was transformed into a full peacekeeping mission. The mission according to its earlier mandate was to have the specific objectives of prioritize civilian protection; facilitate the save delivery of humanitarian aid; and monitor the N'djamena ceasefire agreement (ICG, 2005a, p.3; ICG, 2005b, p.4). The changes in the dynamics of the conflict have necessitated changes in the mandate of the mission to accommodate realities on ground in Darfur. Of significant importance particularly with regard to civilian security is the incorporation of civilian protection. Though it was limited to those 'Civilians whom it encounters under imminent threats and in the immediate vicinity, within resource and capability' (AU, 2004a; AU, 2004b; ICG, 2005c, p.17-18). Limited, as the protection mandate was it gave AMIS the chance to offer the needed protection to the hapless civilians of Darfur.

As attacks on civilians continued unabated and an AMIS mandate change to accommodate the changing realities the strength of the force was increased. From a ceasefire monitoring mission with force strength of less than a thousand personnel, AMIS troop level increased to 3,320 for AMIS II and 7,731 for AMIS II-Enhanced (Jooma, 2006, p.6). All the changes were informed by reports of assessment missions conducted by the AU regarding the mission capability to deliver on its aims and objectives. Notwithstanding the transformation that AMIS undergone, the security situation in Darfur continue to deteriorate as parties to the conflict did not cease violating the provisions of numerous agreements they have entered into (Saka, 2006, p.138). Worst still AMIS lacks the capability to enforce those agreements.

The apparent incapability of AMIS to carry out its mission mandate stems from the various problems confronting the African Union and its peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Prominent among such problems is the issue of inadequate fund available to the African Union and its mission in Darfur. It is an open secret that the greater portion of the fund for running AMIS comes from foreign donors, important of which are the United States, the European Union, the Nordic Countries, Canada and host of other bilateral donors. Aside funding problem the African Union and its mission lack the expertise and personnel needed for a mission the like of the one mounted in Darfur. The troop level available to AMIS is critically low. Even with an increase to more than 7,000 such number is still inadequate to protect civilian and police a region the size of Darfur in peace talk less of in conflict.

AMIS also faces the problem of inadequate logistics and equipment essential for it to carry out it mandate

given its small troop level. AMIS peacekeepers are critically under armed compared to the parties in conflict in Darfur. Given the fact that AMIS is outnumbered and clearly outgunned in destructive power and range of weapons, the mission task is nothing but an impossible one. Worsening the situation for AMIS is the restricted nature of its mission mandate particularly with regards to civilian protection and the non adherence to the numerous agreements that informed its deployment by parties to the conflict (Saka, 2006, p.139-142; Cohen, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2006; Chin and Morgenstern, 2005).

All these problems informed the perception that AMIS is incapable of enforcing its mandate effectively. This has had fatal repercussion for AMIS personnel as its troops came under constant harassment with serious fatality by parties to the conflict in Darfur. From a political legitimacy angle there was also the suspicion among parties to the conflict and civilians that AMIS was bias towards the government of Sudan and SLM/ Minnawi faction (Jooma, 2006, p.13). Whether perceived or real the sense of partiality eroded every iota of neutrality that AMIS has among groups that were not signatory to the Abuja agreement. As AMIS troops become demoralized and fearful they attempted less civilian and humanitarian delivery protection. The tactful commendations of AU efforts that have come from various quarters in the past were replaced by cynicism and increasing awareness that the African Union Mission in Darfur was under-funded, under-manned, ill equipped and is failing more than ever before. The conclusion being that the AU mission has virtually collapsed as a force to reckon with in Darfur.

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## **FROM AMIS TO UNAMID: DARFUR AND THE CHALLENGES OF DURABLE PEACE**

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Although AMIS has strive to proactively interpret and carried out the task of its mandate, especially with regards to the protection of civilians, yet its efforts has not been enough to deter attacks against defenseless civilians. This as earlier argued resulted both from internal and external constraints that the mission encountered. Given those constraints and other factors militating against the success of AMIS, the mission deterrent effect was greatly diminished as its own forces came under increasingly deadly attacks. In view of the deteriorating security situation throughout Darfur, the non-implementation of the provisions of the DPA especially its security requirement and AMIS incapability to hold parties to observe the ceasefire agreement, it has become glaring that the African Union led intervention has hit the rock.

The worsening situation in Darfur led to renew call on the United Nations to intervene in Darfur through the deployment of a more robust peacekeeping mission. Though the government of Sudan tenuously resisted

United Nations intervention, with strong pressure Khartoum resistance was subdued and the joint United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur UNAMID was deployed in 2008. Currently the largest UN authorized peacekeeping mission in the world, UNAMID's mandate has since been extended coupled of time in line with changing reality in Darfur. At present, UNAMID force strength stands at 92 per cent of its authorized troop strength of almost 20,000.

The AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur represents an emerging model of resource pulling and burden sharing in international peace and security operation aimed at enhancing sustainable peacekeeping. Cilliers (2008) canvass for such collaboration when he noted that more can and should be done by the United Nations and the African Union in pursuit of an integrated system that will play meaningful role in peace keeping on the continent. While Othieno and Samasuwo (2007, p.33-36) note that the establishment of hybrid mission represents novelty in recent efforts in the field of security co-operation between a global and regional intergovernmental organization, however, they argued that such arrangement raises more problems than previously acknowledged. In the same vein, Gowan and Johnstone (2007, p.11) also note that while cooperative security arrangements are welcome, they should not provide a 'license for any state or organization with the capacity to intervene to do so'. Though questions continue to revolve around the sustainability and effectiveness of such collaborative security arrangement, however, as Oluwadare (2011, p.191) notes there is no doubt that the security cooperation between the AU and UN would yield good effect and aid the cause of peace and stability in Darfur.

The official UN decision authorizing the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur, UNAMID came through UN Security Council Resolution 1769 of 2007. The resolution was adopted by the Security Council at its 5727<sup>th</sup> meeting on the 31 July, 2007 (UNSC, 2007). The rationale for mandating the mission as expressed by the Council was; "to support the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement DPA". The Council authorization mandating the establishment of the hybrid mission stipulated that the mission will be for an initial period of 12 months as set out in the resolution and in pursuant to the report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007 (UNSC, 2007, p.3). Acting under the umbrella of Chapter VII of the United Nations charter, the Security Council, through its resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007 decided that UNAMID is authorized to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to:

1. protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom

- of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers;
2. support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.

The council also decided that the mandate of the mission as set out in paragraph 54 and 55 of the report of the UN Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007 and as endorsed in the UN Security Council resolution 1769 shall includes:

1. To contribute to the restoration of necessary security conditions for the safe provision of humanitarian assistance and to facilitate full humanitarian access throughout Darfur;
2. To contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians, within its capability and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan;
3. To monitor, observe compliance with and verify the implementation of various ceasefire agreements signed since 2004, as well as assist with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements;
4. To assist the political process in order to ensure that it is inclusive, and to support the African Union-United Nations joint mediation in its efforts to broaden and deepen commitment to the peace process;
5. To contribute to a secure environment for economic reconstruction and development, as well as the sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes;
6. To contribute to the promotion of respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Darfur;
7. To assist in the promotion of the rule of law in Darfur, including through support for strengthening an independent judiciary and the prison system, and assistance in the development and consolidation of the legal framework, in consultation with relevant Sudanese authorities;
8. To monitor and report on the security situation at the Sudan's borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.

Regarding force strength, the council decides that UNAMID which shall incorporate AMIS personnel shall consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each (UNSC, 2007, p.3). As at 31 October 2011

UNAMID force strength stood at 22,882 total uniformed personnel. The breakdown includes; 17,723 troops, 239 military observers, 4,920 police (including formed units). The civilian component of the mission in Darfur includes; 1,130 international civilian personnel, 2,902 local civilian staff and 481 United Nations Volunteers (UNAMID, 2011). UNAMID also has at its disposal a strong revenue base to fund the mission responsibilities. The approved budget for the mission by the United Nations for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 amounted to USD 1,689,305,500 (One billion, Six hundred and Eighty-Nine million, Three Hundred and Five thousand and Five hundred US dollar) (UNGA, 2011, p.2).

Unlike AMIS it predecessor, UNAMID civilians protection responsibilities, which represents the core of the mission mandate is not only broad (military patrol and civilian community policing) but it is also more proactive. Given the mission force strength, the logistic and financial resources within it reach and the robust of the mission's civilian protection mandate it is no surprise that UNAMID has been more proactive and successful in enhancing the safe provision of humanitarian assistance and in facilitating secured humanitarian access throughout Darfur. Towards the realization of it mission's mandate and operation task UNAMID force conducts around 160 patrols on a daily basis. This represents an affirmation of the mission's attempt to increase its robustness, often in the face of numerous bureaucratic and/or armed obstructions. UNAMID has and continued to strive to do everything in its power to protect civilians in Darfur, facilitate humanitarian aid operation to all areas, regardless of who controls them, and to help provide an environment in which peace can take root (UNAMID, 2011).

The United Nations through its active support for the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur continue to encourage political negotiation and the peace process in Darfur. UNAMID continue to work at intensifying diplomatic and political efforts aimed at bringing groups' that are non-signatory to the Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006 into the peace process. As part of its contribution in pushing the political process in Darfur, UNAMID actively collaborate with stakeholders involved in the organization of the All Darfur Stakeholders' Conference held in Doha, Qatar, between 27 and 31 May 2011. UNAMID was involved in the facilitation of the signature of the agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement on the adoption of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, DDPD and continue to reiterate the importance of political settlement on the basis of the DPA and DDPD.

Without much doubt, it is clear that UNAMID has assiduously works to improve the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur. It continues to proactively engage with parties to the conflict in its efforts

at monitoring the ceasefire agreement of 2004 and push the peace process. Within the limits afforded by its logistic capabilities and financial resources UNAMID continue to proactively deploy its forces in manner as to protect the hybrid operation's personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations-African Union personnel, humanitarian workers and assessment and evaluation commission personnel. The mission has also strive to prevent the disruption of the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement by armed groups and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks and threats against civilians through round the clock military patrols and community policing in communities and displaced persons camps.

This notwithstanding, UNAMID has failed to fully utilized and maximize its force strength, logistic capabilities and resources at its disposal to protect civilians in Darfur as would have been expected. The position of the United Nations Security Council in its most recent resolution on Darfur aptly underscores this failure. The Council in resolution 2003 of 29 July 2011 stated that UNAMID need to make full use of its mandate and capabilities, giving priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources to;

1. the protection of civilians across Darfur, including through proactive deployment and patrols in areas at high risk of conflict, securing IDP camps and adjacent areas, and in implementing a mission-wide early warning strategy and capacity; and
2. ensuring safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access, and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and humanitarian activities, so as to facilitate the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout Darfur.

The Council request UNAMID to maximize the use of its capabilities, in cooperation with the UN Country Team and other international and non-governmental actors, in the implementation of its mission-wide comprehensive strategy for the achievement of these objectives (UNSC, 2011, p.3).

Aside this, other issues have contributed to undermine the security of Darfurian, UNAMID's personnel and stalled the realization of durable peace in Darfur. One of such challenges is the problem of fractionalization and the apparent lack of cooperation among the rebel movements. The splintering of the rebel movements that followed in the wake of the signing of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja has make the realization of a lasting peace in Darfur to become elusive (Hassan, 2010). Contrary to expectation, the DPA ended any semblance of unity within or between the SLM/A and the JEM when major factions refused to sign the agreement citing major shortcomings the most critical been the lack of ownership

by parties to the peace process (Oluwadare, 2011, p.201-202). Since then, the once strong rebel movement has fragmented into several factions<sup>3</sup>. This splintering is not in the spirit of the peace efforts and has largely worked to undermine the enforcement of ceasefire and peace agreement.

The fractionalization of rebel movements on it part have reinforce mistrust among parties to the conflict in Darfur, resulting in constant breaches of the ceasefire agreement and increasing attacks between parties and against civilians. An indication of the continued precarious security situation was the attack suffers by UNAMID military patrol on Sunday 6 November 2011 in which a peacekeeper was killed and two other seriously injured. The attack comes less than one month after three UNAMID peacekeepers were killed in an ambush in North Darfur and is the latest in a series of hostile actions directed at UNAMID personnel, as well as humanitarian aid workers (UN News Centre, November 6, 2011). Showing the depth of its worry the United Nations Security Council in its resolution 2003 of July 2011 notes thus:

The Council express deep concern at the deteriorating security situation in some parts of Darfur, including ceasefire violations, attacks by rebel groups, aerial bombardment by the Government of Sudan, inter-tribal fighting, attacks on humanitarian personnel and peacekeepers, which have restricted humanitarian access to conflict areas where vulnerable civilian populations reside, as contained in the Secretary General report... The Council calls on all parties to cease hostilities, including all acts of violence committed against civilians, and urgently facilitate unhindered humanitarian access (UNSC, 2011, p.2).

Worried by the security situation, the Council reminded parties to the conflict that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur, and that an inclusive political settlement is essential to re-establishing peace. The Council also expressed its concern at the return to hostilities between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Army, Minni Minawi faction (SLA/MM), and the ongoing hostilities between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Army, Abdul Wahid faction (SLA/AW), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (UNSC, 2011, p.3). The Council view was an affirmation of the fact that the security situation in Darfur remains tenuous as parties to the conflict in Darfur continue to conduct deadly attacks against each other positions as well as target civilians, humanitarian aid workers and UNAMID personnel. Much as UNAMID has strive to give effect to the actualization of its mission's mandate and operational tasks the security situation in Darfur remains in a state of flux and the peace process in limbo. Rather than been view essentially as failure on the part of UNAMID, the situation in Darfur is largely an indication of the complexity of peacekeeping and the challenge of negotiating sustainable peace in the context of an intractable conflict.

## CONCLUSION

Since, the commencement of hostilities in Darfur, the African Union has been the leading international actor striving for the fastest possible means to resolve the conflict and ameliorate human suffering. The African Union took the initiative of kick-starting the political negotiation that led to the making of the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5, 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria. The organization through its Peace and Security Council also facilitate the deployment of a multilateral continental peacekeeping mission, AMIS. The mission was charged with the responsibility of monitoring the ceasefire and other agreements entered into by parties to the conflict, as well as, protect civilians whom its encounter under imminent threats within resources and capability.

It was on record that the African Union was bold enough to take the initiative to resolve the crisis in Darfur, while there was no alternative, for that alone the continental organization needs to be commended. However, as events in Darfur unraveled, it became quite glaring that the AU critically lacked the capacity, resources and ultimately the political will to hold parties to the conflict accountable to their numerous commitment. Not only that, the AU mission also lacks the capability to mount proactive military patrols and provide the much-needed protection for civilian and humanitarian aid delivery. As the critically under-armed, under-manned and resources starved AMIS was tested by parties and found incapable of upholding its mandate, so does its deterrent value diminished. This has had fatal consequences for civilian, humanitarian aid delivery and AMIS personnel as well. As the security situation deteriorates and attacks directed at civilian, aid delivery and AMIS personnel increase the call for United Nations full intervention become strident.

Arising from the worsening security and political situation, the United Nations authorized the deployment of an African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur in 2007. Invested with a strong mandate, adequate resource and logistic capabilities it come as no surprise that UNAMID has been able to demonstrate a proactive capacity to protect civilian, secure access for humanitarian aid delivery, protect its personnel and equipments and monitor the ceasefire between parties to the conflict in Darfur more than its predecessor AMIS. Notwithstanding UNAMID's relative success the security and political situation in Darfur still remains tenuous. This can be traced to the fact that there still remains a number of challenges militating against the peace process and undermining the security environment.

Crucial among these challenges is the splintering of the two main rebel movements into numerous groups. This has works to weaken the cohesion of the rebel front, undermine their unity of purpose and diminish their power of negotiation with the government in Khartoum. The

fractionalization of the rebel movements has contributes to the undermining of the security situation in Darfur as it has galvanize rancor and in-fighting among the rebel groups and generates increase in the incidence of armed confrontation between the rebel groups and the government of Sudan. Thus, rather than being a shortcoming on the part of UNAMID the non-realization of sustainable peace and security in Darfur is more a result of the internal and external dynamics associated with the conflict in Darfur.

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## NOTES

1. See Chapter VIII, Article 52, 53 and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization for provisions guiding intervention to protect peace and security by regional organizations.

2. For a comprehensive overview of the provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement see, 'Darfur Fragile Peace Agreement' an International Crisis Group Africa Briefing Paper, Number 39, 20 June 2006.

3. The two rebel movements that started the revolt in Darfur in 2003 were the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, SLM/A and the Justice and Equity Movement, JEM. Following the rancor that characterized the final negotiation and signing of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, the supposed unity within the two rebel movement begin to unravel as splinter groups emerged from the two. The rebel groups in Darfur now includes; the Sudan Liberation Movement/Minnawi faction; the Sudan Liberation Movement/Nur faction; the Sudan Liberation Movement/Unity; Justice and Equity Movement; the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance; the National Movement for Reform and Development; the Popular Forces Troops, and the Sudan Democratic Group among others. See Darfur Australia Network ([www.darfuraustralia.org](http://www.darfuraustralia.org)).

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