Discourses and Scottish Nationalist Movement

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Abstract
Scottish nationalist movement has been on the rise ever since the 1920s and reached its climax in September 2014, when the independence referendum aroused world-wide attention. Numerous literatures have been written about it and various adjectives have been used to describe it. Among which, civic, cultural and neo-nationalism were most often associated with it. Yet, it must be pointed out that just like nationalism is multi-dimensional, there is no clear-cut dichotomy between these categories. Nationalist movement is a dynamic process in response to different discourses, which are manipulated by different groups of people to serve certain purposes. Discourses can add impetus as well as detriment to nationalist movement.

Key words: Discourse; Nationalist movement; Dynamic; Construction

INTRODUCTION
Scottish nationalism has aroused much controversy, such as whether it is more civic than ethnic, neo-nationalism or modern nationalism. Yet, it is imperative that we regard nationalism as a dynamic process, because Scottish nationalism has gone through different phases and each phase was led by different leaders (though sometimes led by the same leader). During each phase, different discourses have been deployed by its leading parties to serve certain purposes. Thus, nationalism in each phase take in different forms and each phase has its own distinctive features.

1. THE FUNCTION OF DISCOURSE IN THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONALISM
In Scotland, nationalism involves more a specific culture, based on “institutions” that are specific to British nation and resultantly created its identity: the Presbyterian Church, a judicial system based on civil law and an independent education system that privileges state establishments (Balent, 2013). For MacCormick, cultures have value in terms of identity to their possessions and linked to this principle are the political relevance of the shared national consciousness (Menéndez & Fossum, 2011).

National identity is based upon the conception of a collective national consciousness, whose sources are culturally based, but need not be pre-determined or given, and can be forged. (Menéndez & Fossum, 2011). National consciousness arises through a process of constructing imaginary common interests, a construction which can result in the establishment of a territorial nation state, but only at that point will the nation have a material reality outside of consciousness (Davidson, 2000). Likewise, Hobsbawm asserted that aspects of national and cultural identity are at times purposely created through “invention of traditions” by those in control (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2003). For example, Colley argued that the development of a British identity was socially constructed to defend against the threat of the French other (Colley, 2003).

The internal inclusion of these national and cultural identity exercises a mutually reinforcing effect on all the components of the structure or system where...
nationalism embedded. These are universally shared, and their hallmark is that each state and nation should be the bearer of a distinct national identity. This isomorphic pressure takes a distinct form, which we might label as the “universal programming of national specificity”. In other words, nationalism is programmed to highlight certain forms of specificity as being distinctive of the community; these are not natural distinguishing features, but are raised to prominence by those in charge of the nation-building process. A successful nation-building process presents these features as “natural”, distinctive and designative of a given community. They appear as institutional facts (Menéndez & Fossum, 2011).

According to Neil MacCormick, nationalism is everywhere, but it might be cloaked in different language such as legitimate state interests of free exercise of self-determination (Menéndez & Fossum, 2011). As for Scotland, the most often cited discourse is that Scotland is a civil society, this civic nationalism has long been a tradition of Scotland for the 1707 Union did not remove from Scotland any of the major institutions of civic life, notably the church, the legal system and the system of local government. These established the precedent that what we would now call social policy would be debated and made in Scotland by Scottish agencies. A sense of social responsibility originated from the moral discipline of Presbyterianism, culminating in a consensual ground of middle opinion in the 1930s and creating Scotland’s own manner of debating social policy and its own way of accepting political currents (Paterson, 2000).

This kind of civic nationalism has been widely accepted. For McCrone, Scottish nationalist movements exemplified the so-called neo-nationalism in that it tends to prospect where coherent and strong civil societies are in place (McCrone 1998). For Jonathan Hearn, ‘Scottish people, especially activists in the home rule cause make considerable effort to assert and highlight the civic and liberal character of nationalism in Scotland’ (Hearn, 2003a). For Lindsay Paterson, ‘Scottish nationalist was consigned to the private sphere of civil society, sharply separate from the world of politics’ (Paterson, 2000b).

However, it must be noted that this kind of discourse dominated only in certain time period and serve for certain purpose, even vary to different people at the same time. For example, Leith and Soule have shown that Scottish political elite attempts to present a modernist, civic view of national identity are completely at odds with public conceptions of Scottish identity, which is based on ethnic criteria (Leith & Soule, 2011). According to Tom Gallagher, since the SNP was elected after 2007, it put less and less emphasis on civic nationalism, instead promoting individual self-reliance along with communal solidarity in order to stress the vision of a Scotland based on group identities. The SNP even tried to alter the character of some civic groups that have been long holding sway over the state and even the justice system in centuries past, its particular attention to Scottish Muslims and Scottish Catholics of Irish descent is a case in point. It used a “victim mentality” to touch chords of unity and resonated with feelings of hostility and resentment toward England to shape Scottish popular culture. This multicultural, group-values approach to minority relations proved very effective in breaking new political ground as part of its quest for votes. SNP even hire “leaders” from within a group in order to manage its political involvement (Gallagher, 2009).

It is not the point here to expound on whether the point that Scottish nationalism is civic in nature is valid or not. The point is, nationalism can take form in every shape, it changes with the circumstance and the purpose it is used to serve. The form Nationalism will take depends on the availability of governance and sovereignty models in our contemporary world, on the institutional expression of collective identity, and on the particular stage of development (Menéndez & Fossum, 2011).

Actually, there is no point separating them and putting them into a static arena, rather, they are dynamic driving force, each part of them can be employed by people for the fulfillment of some purpose. They change with time. The problem is not which part is more important, but which part is more appropriate for a certain purpose. Accordingly, different discourse was used to underline the forms that nationalism take as well as strengthen or weaken these nationalism in different time.

2. Discourses Used for Nationalist Movement in Different Phase

2.1 From 1920s to World War

The first stirrings of nationalism as a political entity were evidenced by the founding of the Nationalist Party of Scotland in 1928 (Harvie, 1998). Such feeling of identity was evidently so strong, that two and a half million people signed the Scottish Covenant, petitioning for home rule (Crossing Swords, 2007). At that time, a discourse of England colonized Scotland was very popular. This kind of discourse was proposed by Jackson and Maley. According to Liam Connell, this kind of belief was based upon two key rhetorical manoeuvres: a suppression of the material conditions of Scottish development in favour of a concentration upon the cultural aspects of Scottish modernization, and a conflation of the suppression of Gaelic culture in the Scottish Highland with the standardization of Scottish Anglophone culture (Connell, 2004). These two features are central to this kind of colonial analysis to Scotland. According to Liam Connell, they are also hallmarks of early Scottish nationalist politics. At that time, there were apparent similarities.
between Scottish and English cultures, thus, Scotland needs to construct models in which a fundamental cultural division between these countries could be identified.

The first nationalist organization to explicitly identify a colonial relationship between Scotland and England was the Scots National League (SNL). Founded in 1920, SNL has been identified as “the most important” of the interwar nationalist organizations “with regard to the development of Scottish nationalist philosophy” in the post-war era (Finlay, 1994). This movement’s origins were in the Highland Land league and the turn-of— the-century Gaelic cultural organizations, associations that led to a ready identification with the Irish independence movement and to the championing of Gaelic culture within Scotland itself. These affiliations led to the SNL’s elaboration of a colonial interpretation of Anglo-Scottish relations in an attempt to explain the neglect of Celtic culture within Scotland (Connell, 2004).

From 1920s to 1940s, the setting up of the British welfare state also provoked this sense of colony. Cultural bodies such as the Saltire Society, the Scottish Youth Hostels Association and the National Trust for Scotland suspected that the setting up of the British welfare state centralised powers in London. Such kind of suspicion surfaced in 1930s and stirred up Labour’s Tom Johnson to abandon his commitment to home rule in return for gaining the freedom to pursue distinctively Scottish domestic policies in wartime. This nationalism reached a climax in the national covenant of 1949, with 2 million people petition for home rule. When it subsides, it made a more autonomous Scottish welfare state than ever (Paterson, 2000a).

2.2 From 1945 to Late 1970s
The rise of welfare state after 1945 strengthened centralization and allowed the British government to tap important new sources of social and economic legitimacy. In the early 1970s, the discovery and commercial exploitation of North Sea Oil gave nationalism another boost by suggesting that an independent Scotland might enjoy self-sufficiency. Still, the desire to challenge the Union was not widely held in Scotland (Gallagher, 2009).

The nationalism movement was less salient in the consensus years of the 1950s and 1960s, especially when Scottish and English electoral results showed a degree of convergence. The ethos of consensus and consultation, which Paterson sees as a distinctly Scottish feature, was also the hallmark of British policy making (Keating, 2001).

At that time, the working class and the new professional middle classes of Scotland in the mid-twentieth-century believed that they had solved the problem of balancing ‘big government’ against local choice and cultural diversity. They could get the resource advantages of being part of the economically powerful UK, for tax revenues are redistributed not only between the rich, south-eastern English core and central Scotland, but also the massively underdeveloped rural regions in Scotland.

Meanwhile, the channelling of this redistribution through a distinctive arm of the central state bureaucracy—the Scottish Office—ensured that local professionals had a great deal of say in how the money was spent. The spending of public money became the responsibility of “experts”, doctors, teachers, social workers, planners, and so on who could adapt state-wide mandates to local conditions. It is ideal to deal with Scottish peculiarities in that way (Paterson, 2000b).

2.3 From Late 1970s to 1997
The Scottish nationalism as we know it today began to take shape only in 1960s and 1970s, and achieved its present ideological maturity in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. The Scottish nationalism that emerged from this testing period was unusual in that it did not demand independence to defend a threatened ancestral culture, but was the most effective way to promote the political agenda of the left in a neoliberal era (Jackson, 2014).

During Thatcherism period, Scottish civic society played a major role in mobilizing a strong public opinion against conservative government, which came more from the informal and mass to oppose the threat of Scotland autonomy over its time-honoured civic institutions, especially public comprehensive education system and local democracy.

During the Thatcher years, Westminster cast aside the custom of avoiding detailed involvement in Scottish internal governance. The free-market reforms launched by her were strongly resisted by the Scottish people, who were comfortable with an interventionist state and found this very hard to accept (Gallagher, 2009).

Many argue that the devolution movement was, at least in part, fuelled by a democratic deficit made obvious by the extent to which a nation was governed by people they did not elect. McCrone, Paterson, Hearn, and Shaw & Martin all think that the devolution settlement was the result of a populist movement against Thatcherism, which created solidarity among civil society (Nielsen, 2007).

The 1707 Union Act had secured a perpetual separation of the Scottish and English education system, Scottish education policy had ever since been recognised to be in Scottish hands (Holliday, 1992). Yet ever since the 1970s, Scotland was under ever more pressure on adopting the same policies as that of the UK when Thatcher adopted wholesale “marketisation” of public schooling, many policy proposals coming from Westminster have been imposed on Scotland. For Scottish people, institutions such as local government and state schools were key aspects of Scottish national identity. At that time, Scottish civic society exercised greater power, they formed a strong civic consensus that public schooling is a force for good, and public schooling serves to equalise opportunity
and counter disadvantage. Besides, there are some intermediary institutions which might sabotage or at least divert radical policy of Thatcher. In particular, there has always been a powerful and highly cohesive policy community in education, which includes officials in the Scottish education department, leaderships the teaching union, education college principals and local officials (Holliday, 1992). The continuous participation of civic institution in policy-making process has strengthened their policy-making capacity, thus ensure policy innovations are not restricted only to civil servants and ministers (Paterson, 2000a).

Another example was the introduction of new certificates of vocational education in the mid-1980s, when Thatcher and David Young were intended to use the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) to by-pass the education departments in Scotland. This provoked concerted opposition from Scotland, led by the schools inspectorate. Working closely with representatives of local authorities, teachers, lecturers in further education colleges and employers, the inspectorate developed in a short period of time for an entire new Scottish qualifications framework. Civil servants worked closely with multiple policy communities to effectively change and implement policies on a consensual basis (Costa, 1997).

Despite the increasing centralisation of Westminster’s powers and efforts to assimilate of policies in Scotland and England, Scotland has still retained a largely distinctive civil society. The Scottish myth that Scottish society was more egalitarian than English society was at its highest in the education system. Policies which are perceived to undermine this egalitarian nature are more likely to stimulate nationalist opposition. Parents, teacher unions and teacher opposition against Thatcherism education policy, such as opting out from Local authorities and national testing comes not just from the education professionals but from all sections of Scottish society, including parental pressure groups, the Churches, teachers’ unions and bodies. These resistances were nationalist in the sense that they referred to the myths and traditions which pervade the Scottish education system. Because of the egalitarian myth of Scotland, any policies judged to be socially divisive will be met with this kind of nationalist opposition. Thus, during the Thatcherism period, though lots of radical legislative initiatives have been successfully introduced in Scotland, only a few of them have been implemented, all these nationalist opposition paves the way for home rule and constitutional change (Arnott, 2011). Though resistance at the level of policy initiative was minimal, resistance at the level of policy implementation was maximal. Formal resistance was minimal, informal resistance was maximal (Holliday, 1992). Though Scottish Education Department had a tight control on the structures of policymaking, they are not always able to control some of the process, for the fact that government quangos set up to oversee matters such as curriculum and assessment involved some educationists who stood in opposition to the Department. The authority of educational policymaking has resided with the policy community of educationists that linked government with society and excluded politicians for the most part. (Allan, 2003)

2.4 From 1997 to 2007

By the end of the 1980s, the Labour Party had embraced the “devolution” of greater political autonomy within the United Kingdom to Scotland. For fear of the combined consequence of London’s centralism and radical free-market policies, an increasingly large number of people supported this policy. The first acts that Tony Blair did be a referendum on devolution (Gallagher, 2009). For the New Labour, a Scottish parliament was intended to solve the democratic deficit created by the previous conservative governments. During the 1997 election campaign, George Robertson, Labour’s Secretary of State for Scotland, famously stated that ‘devolution will kill nationalism stone dead’. It was Labour’s strategy to check Scottish nationalism by devolution.

To pacify SNP’s demand for independence, the other parties set up a “Commission on Scottish Devolution”, stating that:

Review the provisions of the Scotland Act 1998 in the light of experience and to recommend any change to the present constitutional arrangements that would enable the Scottish Parliament to serve the people of Scotland better, improve the financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament and continue to secure the position of Scotland within the United Kingdom (Meisch, 2013).

Ever since the new labour came to power, they were intent on reviving the consultative style of devising and implementing policy, renewing the partnership between civil society and the state (Paterson, 2000b). From the beginning of devolution, Labour party has emphasized social justice as a key theme of political debate. Donald Dewar, the first Minister and then Scottish Labour leader, stating in 1999,

We can build on the commitment to social justice which lies at the heart of political and civic life in Scotland.

In the first Labour-led Scottish Government (1999-2003), social inclusion was a flagship item in their policy portfolio (Scott & Wright, 2012). Education best exemplified New Labour’s policy ideas. National priorities for education were introduced in the 2000 Education Act, which also established the presumption of a mainstream school for all children having special educational needs. Inclusion and equality were one of the five national priorities. The devolved Scottish Parliament reiterated its support for comprehensive schools controlled by local government and offering the common curriculum, resisted the role of private sectors in education, Local
authority and civic institutions were professionalized (Munn & Arnott, 2009). A more negotiated, decentralized and network form of governance, with more attention to processes of consultation began to appear since parliamentary devolution (Grek, 2011). A national review group was set up in 1999 to review arrangements for education, extending the consultative procedures in policy-making was intended by the architects of the Scottish Parliament to be part of the “new style of politics”. The legislative procedures of the new Parliament built in requirements to consult with the wider policy community (Munn & Arnott, 2009).

Yet, it is worth noting that devolution was a tactic used by Scottish Labour to forestall the electoral threat to its core support in urban central Scotland from a Nationalist-led opposition. It presented a pragmatic alternative to the risk of the break-up of the UK state (Law & Mooney, 2012a). Devolution was meant to be about legitimating the existing Labour state, its one-party apparatus, nomenclatura class and extension into every aspect of Scottish public life. Labour rule became associated with a minimalist, dismal form of politics centred on authoritarianism (Hassan, 2011).

New Labour undermined its own majority by the manner in which it conducted the devolve institutions. At the British level, Labour treated its Scottish wing as a pliant adjunct. To forestall the SNP gain control of the new legislature and use it as a springboard to independence, Labour proposed proportional-representation(PR) system to elect the Scottish Parliament (Gallagher, 2009). Besides, all the expectations that Scottish people held about the devolved parliament did not come true quickly, such as improve Scotland’s education, health service and economy, empower citizens and strengthen Scotland’s voice in the UK (Paterson, 2015).

2.5 Since 2007

In 2007, the SNP’s manifesto contained a commitment to publish a White Paper on independence for Scotland. In August and November, “Choosing Scotland’s Future—A national Conversation”, “Your Scotland Your Voice” and a first “Draft Referendum Bill” were published (Adam, 2014).

Since then, it inclined to rule through a powerful interventionist state and a clutch of favoured interest groups—the same forces that have dominated Scotland in nearly all political seasons. SNP increased the number of “quangocrats” in various forms of boards, commissions, and committees that play an important auxiliary role in its administration. This kind of nationalism is regarded as populist nationalism (Gallagher, 2009).

SNP parades the full repertoire of populist nationalism, but this marks an essential caution and elitism (Gallagher, 2009). With many citizens to retreat from the public sphere, more and more Scots are now isolated from the traditional civic institutions, that is churches, unions, professional societies. To these politically unanchored voters, the SNP presents itself as a surrogate family. There is evidence of a significant overlap between disconnection from social networks and civic activism and a strongly nationalist outlook on the other. The leader of SNP was keen to notice that there is a big appetite for populist appeals that bypass institutions and procedures, thus resorted directly to raw emotions. By this, a kind of high-octane politics was created in the form of democracy (Gallagher, 2009).

Post-2007 policy-making increasingly relies on networks and horizontal relations across different levels of government and civic society. Since the SNP government emphasized more on displaying independent policy development as part of the overarching policy aim of achieving complete political independence for Scotland (Grek, 2011).

Traditionally, the SNP was portrayed as an activist-based party with social movement characteristics, but in recent years, SNP has become more and more professionalized (Lynch, 2002). Ever since the May 2007, SNP for the first time in its 75-year history had power at national level. Though it was a minority party, SNP behaved as though it was a majority rather than a minority administration. It renamed the Scottish Executive as “The Scottish Government” to position itself as a governing party with the capacity for government (Arnott & Ozga, 2010).

A key strategy used by SNP was the use of a discourse of modernising nationalism, which defines nationalism in ways that stress its fluid, contingent and processual elements, thus link it to the SNP’s agenda for independence (Arnott & Ozga, 2010). Education is a key area for the SNP because it combines the central, inescapable focus on the economy (and education/learning policy will be even more significant in the context of economic difficulty) with the key principle of fairness that references embedded ideas of national identity. For the SNP government, education policy is an arena for the formation and propagation of their discursive blend of social democracy and wealth creation as the key ingredients of modernised nationalism (Arnott & Ozga, 2010) SNP strengthened its relationship with local government, stressing involvement and participation, empowering local authorities through experimentation with “new community” or “full-service” schools. National education priorities emphasize more on areas such as “values and citizenship” and “inclusion and equality” rather than on academic attainment, there was also less central prescription in terms of teaching and curriculum (Brien, 2011).

Another strategy used by SNP is ethno-symbolism to strengthen a sense of shared identity and destiny in Scotland. Ethno-symbolism aims to uncover the cultural and symbolic legacy of past ethnic identities which lie beneath modern nations (Guibernau, 2004). This theory rejects the principle that nations are invented, rather they...
are dependent on “memories, values, myths and symbols” (Smith, 1996). Therefore, ethno-symbolism takes a long historical view, considering centuries past (including the ethnicity which forged them). Only in this way can present day nations be truly understood: the difference between past and present nations is a matter of degree rather than type, and clearly recognizable (Guibernau, 2004). What can be drawn from such theory, is that the historical ups and downs of a nation’s fortunes do little to dent the resilience of strongly formed intergenerational ethnic identity (Özkirimli, 2000). In other words, the ethno-symbolist argument maintains that nations have “historic depth” and ancient components which make up their present day form (McLean & McMillan, 2009).

In terms of ethno-symbolism approach, Smith defined the nation as “a named community possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs” (Smith, 2002) and nationalism as an “ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity” (Smith, 1991).

One particular strength of an ethno-symbolic approach is to help make sense of emotional connections with the past (Özkirimli, 2000). As Leith and Soule highlighted, the sense of belonging held by the masses is not lost on Scottish political parties, who employ the past to connect with the electorate (Leith & Soule, 2011). The SNP for example, has chosen 2014 as the date for the forthcoming referendum on Scotland’s independence, which coincides with the 700 anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn (Constitutional Timeline, n.d.). Therefore, used in this context, ethno-symbolism is potentially a powerful political tool (Guibernau, 2004).

**DISCUSSION**

As demonstrated above, an obvious fact is that social polices were the key policy area that nationalist movement can be easily aroused, such as in the Thatcherism period, or on the contrary to subside nationalist movement, as in the post-war welfare state and New Labour. According to Beland and Lecours, social programmes are more likely than other types of programmes to touch people in everyday life. As a consequence, governments running these programmes can establish direct and tangible links with a population—a potent nation-building tool. Secondly, discussion around specific social policy alternatives can easily be conducted as a debate over core values, principles and identities. In this respect, the language of social policy is similar to discourse of nationalism in so far as one group can argue to have more of a certain quality (for example, egalitarianism or entrepreneurialism) than the other (Scott & Wright, 2012). Social policies can become powerful discourses and exert great power on the people and society affected by them. Thus, it is no coincidence that from the 1920s up until now, education and other social policies took such an eminent place on the policy agenda of each government.

Whether a discourse can be accepted or rejected by the people affected depends on various conditions and circumstances. In the post-war welfare state, because a welfare system benefit almost everyone and distinctive Scottish values and ethos were well-preserved, everyone was complacent, so nationalist movement died down. Nationalist movement during the Thatcherism period elicited the most support from almost every work of life, though most of them came from the civil society and mass. Because the conservative not only destroyed the pillar industries of Scotland, causing thousands of people unemployed and threw Scotland into poverty, but also those marker-driven reforms ran counter to Scotland’s national ethos, that is, egalitarianism, mutual community and democratic equality. All these reforms were resisted because they touched upon every aspect of Scottish people’s daily life.

As for New Labour, even though it put inclusion and equality high on the agenda of reform, adopted a more consultative and consensual policy-making style, devolved power to Scotland, yet the fact that Scottish Labour was under the pressure to be aligned with the British level and did no dare to adopt polices suit the needs of Scotland render it unwelcome in Scotland. Besides, Blair’s capitalism-friendly stance and close foreign-policy alignment with the Bush administration resonated badly in left-leaning Scotland (Gallagher, 2009).

Just as What Michel Foucault said, power is everywhere, diffused and embodied in discourse. Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it. Discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power, it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it (Foucault, 1998).

**CONCLUSION**

Nationalism comes not from a vacuum, but from various discourses by different people to serve different purposes. Social survey data prior to Scotland’s devolution settlement, showed consistent support for a Scottish parliament amongst working class cohorts as opposed to middle class participants (Brown et al., 1996, cited in Gilfillan, 2011).

Smith once posed a famous question as regarding modernist theory. Whilst elites my well have invited the “masses into history” (Nairn, 1981), modernism neglects to ask the question why the masses accepted the invitation (Smith, 1996). As for Scottish nationalism, there are also some questions deserving deep thinking, that is, what are the discourses for nationalism? Who come up with this discourse at the very beginning? Who accept the discourse and who reject it?
REFERENCES


